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ABSTRACT 
Despite a strong naval presence, piracy off the Horn of Africa (HOA) has been rising at 
the impressive annual rate of about 100 percent since 2006. Repression at sea does not 
seem to be working, and it is critical to identify the root cause(s) of piracy before 
additional counter-measures can be applied with any measurable success.   
The rise in piracy off the HOA is blamed by some on the disenfranchisement of 
Somali fishermen. This paper investigates trends in Somalia’s artisanal fisheries over five 
decades, and finds that the rise in piracy off the HOA is not a direct consequence of a 
decline in Somali fisheries. Somalia is unique in many ways, and a number of factors 
there combine to enable piracy to rise in ways unparalleled anywhere else in the world, or 
at any other time in history. Some alternative counter-piracy options can be explored, 
even in the continued absence of a strong central Somali government. 
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A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
The international community has mobilized a lot of resources to deal with piracy 
in the Horn of Africa (HOA) but has obtained very few results. Task Force 151 and 
Operation Atalanta, created by the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU), 
respectively, are military endeavors entirely dedicated to the fight against piracy in the 
HOA.1 Both have been functional for close to two years, and during that period the 
incidence of piracy in the area has risen from 111 attacks in 2008 to 217 in 2009.2 Partial 
figures for 2010 suggest that the 2009 record-breaking number of piracy incidents around 
the HOA will likely be surpassed. It is critical to identify the root cause(s) of piracy 
before additional countermeasures can be applied with any measurable success.  This 
paper uses the process tracing method to investigate economic decline in the fishing 
sector as a possible cause of the exponential rise in Somali piracy.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Somalia has been in turmoil for almost 20 years, since the collapse of the state in 
1991.3 The country now comprises the breakaway Republic of Somaliland to the north; 
the semi-autonomous Puntland to the northeast; and a rump state made up of regions in 
the center and south. Somaliland broke away in 1991 after a three-year civil war, but has 
not been able to gain recognition from the international community. Puntland became a 
self-governing entity in 1998, but still considers itself part of Somalia. While Somaliland 
and Puntland have been relatively peaceful, the rump state has been engulfed in factional 
and sectarian violence since 1991. The current Transitional Federal Government (TFG), 
                                                 
1 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconception and Remedies,” 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, October 2009, 
http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf (accessed February 
19, 2010). 
2 “2009 Annual IMB Piracy Report,” International Maritime Bureau, January 2010. 
3 “Country Profile: Somalia,” British Broadcasting Corporation, January 1, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm (accessed January 16, 2010). 
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which is the fourteenth of its kind, is as fragile as the previous thirteen attempts at 
rebuilding a national government in Somalia, and there are no signs that it can stop the 
violence and reunify the various clans and breakaway regions under one rule.4 Despite 
financial and material assistance from the international community, the current TFG 
backed by more than 6,000 international peacekeepers is barely holding on to a few 
blocks of the capital, Mogadishu, and is under increasing pressure from the Al Shabaab 
Islamist group.5 Twenty years of instability have pushed many Somalis out of their 
homeland in search of a better life abroad. Those left behind are caught up in an unending 
cycle of violence, and millions of them are currently threatened by starvation, producing 
the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.6 Assistance from the international community 
has been substantial over the years, but the chaos within Somalia has greatly hampered 
relief efforts. Today, piracy is adding another dimension to the tragedy in Somalia. 
Piracy off the long coastline of Somalia (and more recently well out to sea from 
that coastline) occurs across one of the busiest routes of maritime trade. According to 
recent estimates, piracy worldwide—of which Somalis contribute more than 50 percent—
is costing the global economy between one and sixteen billion dollars a year.7 This 
amount represents a very small fraction of the multi-trillion dollar business of global 
maritime trade,8 but if left unchecked the growing phenomenon could have disastrous 
economic, political, and security consequences worldwide. Mindful of this, the 
international community has been multiplying efforts to limit piracy in the region. 
However, these efforts have not produced the desired results, as piracy has continued to 
rise at an alarming annual rate of about 100 percent since 2006.9  
                                                 
4 Jennifer G. Cooke and Richard Downie, “African Conflicts and U.S. Diplomacy: Roles and 
Choices,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (January 2010).  
5 “Country Profile: Somalia.” 
6 Donna Nincic, “Maritime Piracy in Africa: The humanitarian dimension,” Institute for Security 
studies (2009), 
http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/18NO3NINCIC.PDF?link_id=23&sli
nk_id=8285&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3 (accessed January 24, 2010).   
7 Lauren Ploch, Christopher M. Blanchard, Ronald O’Rourke, R. Chuck Mason, and Rawle O. King, 
“Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2010. 
8 Ploch et al., “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” 
9 “2009 Annual IMB Piracy Report.”  
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The search for solutions to piracy in the HOA has pushed some to look at the 
successes in Southeast Asia (especially in the Strait of Malacca) for applicable lessons,10 
but the differences between the two regions are huge.11 Firstly, Somali pirates have a 
playing field of 2.5 million square miles of ocean space,12 whereas their counterparts in 
the Strait of Malacca have only 25,000.13 Secondly, the regional response in the Strait of 
Malacca was possible because coastal nations there have assets capable of covering the 
relatively small area.14 Somalia has not had a stable government for close to two decades 
now, and even if it did it would lack the naval assets, as do its stable neighbors in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Oman, to cover the very vast area of concern.15 Thirdly, political will, 
which was the driving force in the regional arrangements in Southeast Asia, is absent 
around the HOA. This is because piracy in the HOA is more of a threat to distant 
economies than to the economies of regional states. It is true that vessels of the World 
Food Program (WFP) carrying aid supplies to Somalia have been attacked  
before,16 but generally, the victims of piracy in the area have been commercial vessels in 
                                                 
10 James Kraska,”The Report on the U.S. Naval War College Workshop on Somali Piracy: Fresh 
Thinking for an Old Threat,” April 28, 2009, http://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/International-
Law/RightsideLinks/Piracy-Workshop-2009.aspx (accessed January 20, 2010). 
11 Harnit Kaur Kang, “Gulf of Aden vs Malacca Strait: Piracy and Counter-piracy efforts,” Institute of 
Peace and Conflict Studies, December 2009, http://ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB135-SEARP-Harnit1.pdf 
(accessed January 17, 2010). 
12 “Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan,” U.S. National Security 
Council, December 2008, 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Countering_Piracy_Off_The_Horn_of_Africa_-
_Partnership__Action_Plan.pdf  (accessed February 28, 2010). 
13 “Strait of Malacca,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/359411/Strait-of-Malacca (accessed February 25, 2010). 
14 Ian Storey, “Calming the Waters in Maritime Southeast Asia,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, February 18, 
2009, http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/7781/3/apb029%5B1%5D.pdf.txt (accessed 
February 10, 2010). 
15 Recent IMB reports show acts of piracy and armed robbery within the territorial seas of these 
countries. 
16 Nincic, “Maritime Piracy in Africa: The humanitarian dimension.” 
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transit between the Middle East, Europe, and Asia,17 as well as some of the foreign 
fishing vessels present in large numbers in the Indian Ocean.18 
The fight right now consists of deterrent patrols at sea by warships from more 
than 20 nations19 and a push for stability within Somalia through a strong central 
government.20 The large amounts of financial, material, and diplomatic resources being 
thrown at the problem are indicative of the attention piracy in the HOA is receiving from 
the international community. There have been five UN Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCR) on piracy;21 there are more than 6,000 foreign troops in Mogadishu with an 
international mandate to support the TFG;22 and at any given time, there are at least 15 
warships patrolling off the Somali coast in an unprecedented collaborative effort among 
various countries including Russia, China, India, the U.S., and members of the EU.23   
At sea the fight against piracy is greatly constrained by the lack of adequate 
deterrent measures. The risks are still too low, and the profit is still too high for the 
pirates to opt out unilaterally.24 When an attack is foiled by a patrolling warship, the 
pirates just back off and wait for a softer target. Even when they are captured, the pirates 
are usually released soon afterward due to lack of sufficient evidence, or the lack of an 
                                                 
17 “2009 Annual IMB Piracy Report.” 
18 Andrew Mwangura, “Workshop on Fishing Communities and sustainable Developments in 
Southern and Eastern Africa: A small-scale fisheries perspective,” Seafarers’ Assistance Program, March 
2006, http://www.icsf.net/icsf2006/jspFiles/eastAfrica/pdfs/IUU%20fishing/esaandrewiuu.pdf.PDF 
(accessed July 12, 2010). 
19 Stephanie Hanson, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated January 
7, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/18376/combating_maritime_piracy.html (accessed February 11, 
2010). 
20 Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia: Too Big a Problem to Fail?” Foreign Policy, August 6, 2009, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/06/somalia_too_big_a_problem_to_fail?page=0,1 
(accessed February 20, 2010). 
21 Shani Ross and Joshua Ben-David, “Somali Piracy: An Escalating Security Dilemma,” 
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, August 20, 2009,   
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/745/currentpage/1/Default.aspx (accessed January 24, 
2010). 
22 Ross and Ben-David, “Somali Piracy: An Escalating Security Dilemma.” 
23 Ibid. 
24 Hansen, “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden.” 
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adequate legal framework in many countries.25 The U.S. and some European countries 
have signed agreements with Kenya to prosecute and imprison convicted pirates there,26 
but the system is plagued by many weaknesses, notably legal competency and 
jurisdictional issues based on the nationalities of the skipper, the vessel, the crew 
members, the owner of the vessel, and the arresting authority.27 Also, the presence of 
many warships and the institution of an Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
(IRTC)28 have not been able to prevent pirate attacks. The International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB) reports that vessels have been taken within this protected corridor since its 
inception in February 2009.29   
Most research on piracy between 2000 and 2005 focused on Southeast Asia 
because that is where piracy was the most prevalent,30 and thereafter, for the same reason 
the focus shifted to the HOA. The Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden both lie along 
the most important route of world trade linking Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.31 
Disruption of maritime traffic in any of these strategic areas has deep political, economic, 
and security implications.32 Analyses of the causes of, and the remedies for, modern day 
piracy have generally focused on these two areas. 
At the dawn of this millennium the Strait of Malacca gained the reputation as the 
most pirate-infested waters of the world, and the sharp rise in piracy there was blamed on 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997.33 There is consensus in the literature that economic 
                                                 
25 Abraham Paulos, “Prosecuting Piracy,” Foreign Policy Association, April 23, 2009, 
http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=893742  (accessed January 24, 2010). 
26 Ploch et al., “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” 29. 
27 Ploch et al., “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” 29. 
28 “Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean Transit,” U.S. Department of Transportation, September 
9, 2009, http://www.marad.dot.gov/news_room_landing_page/maritime_advisories/advisory/advisory2009-
07.htm (accessed March 2, 2010). 
29 “2009 Annual IMB Piracy Report.”  
30 Ibid. 
31 James Jay Carafano, Richard Weitz and Martin Edwin Andersen, “Maritime Security: Fighting 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” Heritage special Report, June 24, 2009, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/sr0059.cfm (accessed January 24, 2010). 
32 Carafano, Weitz and Andersen, “Maritime Security.” 
33 David Rosenberg, “The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea,” Naval War College 
review, Summer 2009, 62:3, 46.  
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crisis and political instability combined to drive up the rate of piracy in the late 1990s. 
The Asian financial crisis put many coastal inhabitants out of work, and young men, with 
families to care for, had to look for alternative sources of revenue.34 For those with a 
background in the maritime trade industry or in fisheries, it was natural to look toward 
the sea for solutions, and when no legitimate ones were forthcoming, piracy seemed the 
most rational choice.35 Political instability in Indonesia was another major factor in the 
rise of piracy in Southeast Asia. When piracy there hit record levels in 2003,36 most of 
the culprits were believed to hail from the troubled Aceh province of Indonesia.37 
Political instability, especially when it involves violent conflicts, provides pirates with 
the opportunity to acquire firearms easily, thus making them more effective at sea.38 
However, there is a debate in the literature on Somalia about the relationship 
between economic decline, instability, and piracy.  One camp argues that the collapse of 
the state in 1991 led to widespread lawlessness on land as well as at sea.39 Vessels from 
Asia and Europe were increasingly present within Somali waters, engaging in the 
poaching of maritime resources and the dumping of toxic wastes.40 Over-fishing by 
foreign vessels and the dumping of toxic wastes had the effect of reducing the catch for 
local fishermen and pushing them out of business.41 According to most of the local 
accounts on the causes of piracy, the disenfranchisement of Somali fishermen is seen as 
                                                 
34 Rosenberg, “The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea,” 47. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Nincic, “Maritime Piracy in Africa: The humanitarian dimension.” 
37 Catherine Zara Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: a Problem Solved?” 
Naval War College review, summer 2009, 62:3, 37. 
38 “2009 Annual IMB Piracy Report.” 
39 Brett Schaeffer, “Piracy: A Symptom of Somalia’s Deeper Problems,” The Heritage Foundation, 
April 17, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/africa/wm2398.cfm (accessed December 12, 2009). 
40 “There are Two Piracies in Somalia,” African Loft, April 13, 2009, http://www.africanloft.com 
(accessed February 27, 2010). 
41 Johann Hari, “You Are Being Lied To About Pirates,” Huffington Post, January 4, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/you-are-being-lied-to-abo_b_155147.html (accessed February 
19, 2010). 
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the main reason for the rise in piracy.42 This view contends that the fishermen turned to 
piracy originally as a means of survival,43 but with the success of initial attacks piracy 
soon developed into the very lucrative business that it is today.44 After many years of 
unheeded complaints all the way up to the United Nations Organization (UN),45 the 
fishermen took up arms—made readily available by the chaos ashore—to chase out the 
intruders and reclaim their right.46 This self-proclaimed “Coast Guard” was the precursor 
of today’s pirate rings in Somalia.47  
Many others argue that piracy at sea, just like criminal activities on land, is a 
consequence of state collapse; blaming poachers is simply an excuse that the pirates use 
to justify what is actually a lucrative criminal enterprise. The pirates are richer than the 
fishermen ever were,48 and this new trade is continually attracting recruits from 
communities far inland who have little or no history of fishing.49 This second argument, 
which discards the role of Somali fishermen, is prevalent and has guided counter-piracy 
efforts thus far.  
Somalia has been without a stable government now for close to two decades, but 
piracy only became a problem in the last five years.50 The fishery industry suffered from 
the widespread violence ashore after state collapse,51 but managed to stay viable until 
                                                 
42 Katie Stuhldreher, “To turn the tide on piracy in Somalia, bring justice to its fisheries,” Christian 
Science Monitor, November 20, 2008, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/1120/p09s01-coop.html (accessed February 18, 
2010). 
43 SteveTomkins, “Fishermen seeking a bigger catch,” Church Times, July 3, 2009, 
http://www.churchtimes.co.uk/content.asp?id=77357 (accessed February 19, 2010). 
44 Mohamed Olad Hassan, “’It’s a pirate’s life for me’,” British Broadcasting Corporation, April 22, 
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/8010061.stm (accessed February 27, 2010). 
45 “There are Two Piracies in Somalia,” African Loft. 
46 “There are Two Piracies in Somalia.” 
47 Ibid. 
48 Raymond Gilpin, “Counting the Cost of Somali Piracy,” United States Institute of Peace, June 22, 
2009, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_0.pdf (accessed January 17, 2010). 
49 Hansen, “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden.” 
50 Nincic, “Maritime Piracy in Africa: The humanitarian dimension.” 
51 “Fishery Country Profile: The Somali Republic,” Food and Agricultural Organization, January 
2005, http://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_SO.pdf (accessed February 18, 2010). 
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2005.52 The timing in the decline of fisheries in Somalia and the rise in maritime piracy 
suggests of a possible link between these two variables. Some have identified the link, 
but a clear and unequivocal causal relationship has never been established. Whether there 
is causation or mere correlation between the two, is the gap this thesis intends to fill. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Considering that hardship as a result of rapid economic decline within coastal 
populations has historically been one of the root causes of maritime piracy,53 this study 
addresses the question of whether the rise in piracy around Somalia was caused by a 
decline in fisheries production. This question can be answered only by investigating the 
following: 
 Was there a decline in fisheries production? 
 If there was a decline, when did it occur? 
 If there was a decline, did it coincide with a rise in piracy?  
 Were fishermen responsible for the rise in piracy? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The process tracing method is used to determine whether the recent upsurge in 
piracy was caused by Somalia’s disenfranchised fishermen. When two events happen 
simultaneously, it does not mean they are related in any way. Process tracing makes clear 
whether the two events are related and establishes the nature of their relationship.54 It 
addresses the problem of the timing of events, which is critical if one is to determine 
whether events happened simultaneously, or close enough in time to possibly influence 
one another.  
The variables for this study are fish production by Somali coastal communities 
and the level of piracy in the HOA. The International Chamber of Commerce’s IMB is a 
                                                 
52 “Fishery Country Profile: The Somali Republic.” 
53 Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg, “Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical 
and Modern Case Studies,” Naval War College Newport Papers, 35, January 2010.   
54 Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” October 19, 
1997, http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm (accessed March 19, 2010). 
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trustworthy source of data relating to pirate activity.55 It issues regular warnings to 
mariners about areas with the most recent and frequent pirate attacks. Most importantly, 
the IMB has a piracy reporting center that collects and analyzes information on pirate acts 
worldwide, publishing quarterly and annual reports since 1992. Its definition of piracy is 
considered better suited to today’s reality than that contained in the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).56 The incidents reported by the IMB include all 
attempted attacks, both successful and unsuccessful. Prior to 1992, the most reliable data 
on piracy worldwide was published by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), as 
“Anti-Shipping Activity Messages” (ASAM).57  
Measuring economic trends is usually done at a national level through 
calculations of the GDP. Because this study is concerned only with the plight of coastal 
fishermen, trends in fish production by the artisanal sector should provide a good 
indication of their economic status. The quantity and quality of fish production by both 
the artisanal and industrial sectors were well documented by the Somali Ministry of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR), but after the collapse of the state, data on 
fisheries became generally unreliable. After 1991, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) continued to provide yearly estimates of Somali fish production until 
2005. This study relies on FAO estimates, when they are available, and complements 
these with qualitative assessments provided by articles and reports, especially for the 
period after 2005.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis analyzes piracy and fisheries in Somalia at different time periods to 
see whether there is a relationship between the two variables, and to establish exactly 
when such a relationship began. The first time frame, discussed in Chapter II, covers the 
period from independence in 1960 to state collapse in 1991. Chapter III looks at the 
                                                 
55 ICC Commercial Crime Services http://www.icc-ccs.org.  
56 Hansen, “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden,” 6. See also, Elleman et al., “Piracy and Maritime 
Crime,” 11. 
57 FAS produced yearly ASAM reports between 1985 and 1999. Federation of American Scientists, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pirates.htm.   
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effects of state collapse on piracy and fisheries, while Chapter IV follows with an 
analysis of the effects of the December 2004 tsunami. Each of these chapters offers a 
unique context for understanding challenges to fishermen in particular, and coastal 
dwellers in general. Chapter V summarizes the findings of this study and concludes with 
recommendations on how to reverse the rising trend of piracy in the HOA even within the 
current context of statelessness in Somalia. 
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II. SOMALIA: FISHERIES AND PIRACY BEFORE 1991 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Somalia’s fishermen are blamed by many for the piracy epidemic currently 
plaguing the HOA.58 The argument is that these fishermen resorted to piracy because 
they could no longer depend on their basic source of livelihood, for a variety of reasons: 
the collapse of the state in 1991, the 2004 tsunami, unfair competition from foreign 
vessels, and the dumping of toxic wastes.59 This chapter focuses on the three decades 
between independence in 1960 and the collapse of the state in 1991. It looks at the 
development of the fisheries sector in Somalia as well as the frequency of pirate activities 
around the HOA, and investigates whether trends during this early period suggest a 
relationship between the two. These early trends will also be useful in later chapters to 
trace the evolution of both phenomena in order to ascertain or refute the purported 
inverse relationship between them. 
B. FISHERIES IN SOMALIA PRIOR TO STATE COLLAPSE 
Somalia got its independence from Italy and Britain in 1960, and, like many other 
African countries, it set about the task of developing its institutions and a national 
economic base. With practically no mineral resources, the young Somali economy was 
highly dependent on livestock and agricultural produce.60 The overall trend in the fishery 
sector was one of steady growth, supported by government policy and foreign assistance, 
                                                 
58 This argument, used by pirates to gain legitimacy within their local communities, is made in many 
articles including: Ishaan Tharoor, “How Somalia’s Fishermen Became Pirates,” TIME, April 18, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html (accessed January 8, 2010). See also 
Mohamed Abshir Waldo, “Somali piracy: the other side of the coin,” African Prospects, October 2009, 
http://www.exacteditions.com/exact/browse/576/929/5847/2/9/0/ (accessed through the Naval Postgraduate 
School Library January 10, 2010).  
59 Though the tsunami is not directly cited as a cause of the rise in piracy, it had a devastating effect 
on coastal fishing communities. “The State of the Environment in Somalia,” United Nations Environment 
Programme (2005), 4, 47. http://www.unep.org/depi/programmes/Somalia_Final.pdf (accessed December 
5, 2009). 
60 “The State of the Environment in Somalia,” 17.  
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notably from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).61 Somalia has 
inland waters (rivers and lakes) that present opportunities for freshwater fishing and 
provide subsistence to certain communities,62 but attention here will be exclusively on 
marine fisheries along the 3,300-kilometer coastline since only the saltwater fishermen 
and coastal communities are relevant to this study. Whenever possible, a further 
distinction will be made between the small artisanal fishermen and those who fish on an 
industrial scale. These two groups have a lot in common, but they have different needs 
and are impacted unevenly by external factors, including government policies and 
available technologies. 
1. The Artisanal Sector 
At independence, fishing in Somalia was entirely artisanal, with the main 
platform being the houri, a small canoe that can be propelled manually with paddles or 
fitted with a low powered outboard engine.63 The artisanal fleet was later augmented by 
stronger, locally-constructed, glass-reinforced plastic (GRP) boats, especially through 
government donations in the mid-1970s. By 1991, the artisanal fleet included about 3,000 
boats and houris spread across 50 fishing villages along the coast from Kenya to 
Djibouti.64 The catch was limited by the fact that the boats in use were unsafe to deploy 
more than a few miles from shore, and lacked the logistical capability to remain at sea for 
an extended period of time.65 The artisanal fishermen did not bring in much, but their 
catch was more than enough to satisfy local demand. There was always a sizeable surplus 
of fish owing to the Somalis’ natural preference for other types of meat as their source of 
protein, and this surplus was processed and exported principally to countries in East 
                                                 
61 There was a strong Soviet influence in the politics and economy of Somalia, especially in the early 
years prior to and after independence. I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2002).  
62 “The State of the Environment in Somalia.” 45.  
63 “Fishery Country Profile: The Somali Republic.”  
64 Ibid. 
65 Sharon Billings, “U.S. Exporters and Investors Have an Opportunity To Help Somalia Develop Its 
Fisheries Industry,” Business America, September 25, 1989, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1052/is_n19_v110/ai_7955623/pg_3/?tag=content;col1 (accessed 
March 4, 2010). 
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Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.66 Despite early reports attesting to the richness of 
Somali waters in fish and its huge economic potential,67 the fisheries sector remained 
mostly artisanal and underdeveloped until the drought of 1973 to 1975.68  
The drought had a devastating effect on the agricultural and pastoral communities, 
but also highlighted the potential of the fisheries sector as a sustainable source of 
subsistence for a sizeable portion of the population, as well as a pillar of the national 
economy.69 Ethnic Somalis traditionally shun fisheries, and this activity was exclusively 
practiced by the Bajuni and Amarani tribes of non-Somali origin prior to the drought.70 
Beginning in 1975 the Somali government, through its Coastal Development Project, 
resettled along the coast thousands of nomads who had lost their livelihood,71 and 
supplied five hundred motorized boats to the newly converted fishermen.72 The 
resettlement program increased the number of artisanal fishermen from less than 5,000 to 
about 20,000 by 1980.73 This had the effect of increasing artisanal fish production from 
4,000 tons in 1974 to about 12,000 tons in 1986.74 
 
                                                 
66 “Fishery Country Profile: The Somali Republic.”  
67 Experts of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization conducted many field studies between the 
late 1960s and early 1980s, and found that Somali waters could sustain an annual fish production of about 
200, 000 tons. www.fao.org.  
68 “The State of the Environment in Somalia.” 18. 
69 Billings, “U.S. Exporters and Investors Have an Opportunity To Help Somalia.” 
70 “Somalia: Riverine and Coastal People of Non-Somali Origin,” The Library of Congress country 
studies. 
http://www.photius.com/countries/somalia/society/somalia_society_riverine_and_coastal~1597.html 
(accessed July 14, 2010). 
71 N. P. Van Zalinge, “Summary of fisheries and resources information for Somalia,” UN Food and 
Agricultural Organization (n.d.), http://www.fao.org/docrep/field/303859/3038590b.htm (accessed May 
16, 2010).  
72 “Fishery Country Profile: The Somali Republic.”  
73 Mohamed Yassin, “Somali Fisheries Development and Management,” Somaliland CyberSpace, 
June 1981, http://www.mbali.info/doc278.htm (accessed July 16, 2010). 
74 Van Zalinge, “Summary of fisheries and resources information for Somalia.” 
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2. The Industrial Sector 
The birth of industrial fishing was another consequence of increased government 
effort after the drought. A 1974 joint venture between the Somali state and the USSR 
created SOMALFISH, which operated 10 fishing trawlers in the rich, vast, and 
underexploited waters of Somalia.75 This joint venture, despite its positive impact on 
overall fish production, was summarily terminated in late 1977 when war between 
Somalia and Ethiopia forced the USSR to choose one client over the other, and it chose 
Ethiopia.76 The consequences were immediate. Industrial fish production, which had 
grown from 2,030 tons in 1974 to 4,550 tons in 1977, dropped to a meager 250 tons in 
1978.77 SOMITFISH, a 1981 joint venture with an Italian company was productive for 
only two years before all three of its vessels broke down.78 In 1983 the Italian 
government donated five fishing trawlers to the Somali parastatal SHIFCO in another 
joint venture. This proved to be more durable than SOMITFISH, staying operational long 
after 1991.79 During these tumultuous years the industrial fishing sector stayed afloat 
thanks to privately owned vessels from Japan, Italy, Singapore, Greece, and Egypt.80 
These foreign vessels obtained fishing licenses from the MFMR, which regulated their 
activities within Somalia’s Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), and collected data on their 
catch even though none of it was destined for local consumption.81 SHIFCO and licensed  
foreign vessels enabled unprecedented growth in industrial fishing in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The industrial sector, which was nonexistent prior to 1974, grew to account 
for more than 50 percent of the overall catch by 1987.  
                                                 
75 Billings, “U.S. Exporters and Investors Have an Opportunity To Help Somalia.” 
76 “Somali Fishing Industry Has Potential For Growth,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 1982, http://spo.nmfs.noaa.gov/mfr4412/mfr44124.pdf (accessed November 4, 2009). 
77 Van Zalinge, “Summary of fisheries and resources information for Somalia.”  
78 Ibid.  
79 SHIFCO is an acronym for the Somali High Seas Fishing Company. SHIFCO’s vessels continued 
to operate within Somali waters long after the collapse of the state, though their earnings no longer 
benefitted the Somalis. “Final Mission Report Somalia – SHIFCO,” (November 18, 1998), 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/inspections/vi/reports/somalia/vi_rep_soma_1522-1998_en.pdf (accessed May 
10, 2010). 
80 “Fishery Country Profile: The Somali Republic.”  
81 Van Zalinge, “Summary of fisheries and resources information for Somalia.” 
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3. Trends in Fisheries Production 
 
Figure 1.   Marine Fish Production by the different sectors in Somalia, 1974–1987. 82 
Annual marine fish production (artisanal and industrial combined) went from just 
under 6,000 tons in 1974 to almost 24,000 tons in 1991.83 Exports rose faster than 







                                                 
82 This graph is constructed based on statistics from the Somali Ministry of Fisheries and Marine 
Resources. Van Zalinge, “Summary of fisheries and resources information for Somalia.”  
83 “Fisheries and Aquaculture Country Profiles – Somalia,” Food and Agricultural Organization (last 
updated 2005). http://www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-CP_SO/3/en (accessed February 18, 2010). 
84This figure is almost twice the growth rate for the rest of the world. “Coastal and Marine 
Ecosystems – Somalia,” Earthtrends (2003). 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/coa_cou_706.pdf (accessed December 4, 2009). 
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1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,600 4,600 4,700 5,000 5,000 5,600 
           
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
5,700 5,800 5,900 5,980 10,350 8,268 9,830 8,384 10,984 14,330 9,523 
           
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
8,730 11,195 19,639 16,467 16,500 18,600 19,827 21,046 22,295 23,500 25,500 
           
Table 1.   Somalia—Total annual marine fish capture: 1960–1992 (measured in metric 
tons).  85 
The observed increase in fish production from both the artisanal and industrial 
sectors was facilitated by the growth of supporting infrastructure. Conservation improved 
from the mid-1970s with the construction of cold rooms, sponsored by foreign aid, in all 
the main fishing centers.86 Distribution too became easier through cooperatives, created 
in the aftermath of the 1973 to 1975 drought and regulated by the MFMR.87 A detailed 
1988 FAO report shows a well-developed fisheries sector comprising twenty-nine 
cooperatives involved in the capture, conservation, and distribution of fish products.88 
Locals also set up companies for the construction and repair of the small boats employed 
by the artisanal fishermen.89 By the mid 1980s the fishery sector employed about 30,000 
full-time and 60,000 part-time workers at various stages of fish production, which 
represented 10 percent of the coastal population and 2 percent of the entire Somali work 
force.90  
 
                                                 
85 Table constructed using software from the Food and Agricultural Organization: Fish Stat Plus at 
www.fao.org.  
86 “Somali Fishing Industry Has Potential For Growth.” See also A. I. Bihi, “Somalia National 
Report,” UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies, No. 51 (1984), 6, 10. 
http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/publications/reports/RSRS/pdfs/rsrs051.pdf (accessed July 14, 2010). 
87 Yassin, “Somali Fisheries Development and Management.” 
88 Van Zalinge, “Summary of fisheries and resources information for Somalia.” 
89 Fishery Country Profile: The Somali Republic.”  
90 Ibid., See also Bihi, “Somalia National Report,” 3. 
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Despite the big strides forward, Somalia’s abundant marine life remained largely 
unexploited in 1991.91 By 1982, the fishing sector had received foreign aid in excess of 
$22 million,92 mostly in the form of storage and processing infrastructure, but production 
and exports were still quite low, accounting for only 1 percent of GDP.93 The central 
government had taken measures to boost fisheries, but they were not enough to enable the 
potential for exponential growth. The government, through fishermen’s cooperatives, 
regulated the artisanal sector, from harvesting to marketing, but had done little more to 
improve production since it provided 500 motorized boats in the mid-1970s. By 
comparison, government assistance, through the creation of the Livestock Development 
Agency in 1965–66, enabled the livestock sector to grow rapidly and overtake banana as 
the principal export commodity.94 By 1981, livestock accounted for about 90 percent of 
Somalia’s total exports.95 Although livestock later declined to only 65 percent of all 
exports by 1990, it still remained the mainstay of the Somali economy. The low level of 
government efforts and the lack of national interest in fisheries could be blamed on a 
culture largely dominated by pastoral nomads who consumed little or no fish and 
generally considered fishermen to be second-class citizens.96 Lastly, the socialist nature 
of the Siad Barre regime meant that it kept a tight control over all economic activities. 
Notwithstanding Somalis’ aversion to fish, there was probably no room for private 
initiatives, which otherwise could have greatly benefitted the fisheries sector.97 
                                                 
91 “Somali Fishing Industry Has Potential For Growth.” 
92 Ibid. 
93 Billings, “U.S. Exporters and Investors Have an Opportunity To Help Somalia.” 
94 “Somalia – The Economy,” The Library of Congress (n. d.), 
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/somalia/ECONOMY.html (accessed October 21m 
2010). 
95 Yassin, “Somali Fisheries Development and Management.” 
96 Ken Menkhaus, “Dangerous Waters,” Survival, 51:1, 21–5, 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a908599137~db=all~order=page  (accessed May 7, 
2010). 
97 The next chapter supports this assertion by showing how fisheries flourished through private 
enterprises, in certain areas, after state collapse. The strangling effects of Siad Barre’s economic policies 
are discussed in this article, William Reno, “Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy,” 
Somaliland Cyberspace, February 2003, http://www.mbali.info/doc129.htm (accessed July 26, 2010). 
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C. MARITIME PIRACY IN SOMALIA PRIOR TO STATE COLLAPSE 
Piracy has plagued many areas of the world ever since vessels first put to sea. The 
long Somali coastline was not exempt from this phenomenon prior to 1991, but piracy 
incidents were neither grave nor frequent enough to catch national or international 
attention.  Worth noting is that the IMB and the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) incident reporting procedures did not exist prior to 1991 and it is likely that most 
pirate acts went unreported.98 However, the scanty data available for this period suggest 
that piracy off the Somali coast was comparatively scarce for an area with such a high 
volume of maritime traffic.  
The Gulf of Aden lies across one of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes 
linking Europe and the Middle East to Asia. An estimated 40,000 vessels of all types 
transit through it every year,99 and yet piracy incidents there during this period were far 
fewer than in South East Asia, which has a similarly high volume of traffic. The 
comparison is even more striking with the West African coast that saw far less traffic, but 
a significantly higher incidence of piracy during the same period.100  
Unfortunately, there are no reliable data for the 1960s or 1970s.  By far the most 
comprehensive documentation of pirate activities in the early 1980s is that compiled by 
Roger Villar.101 Of the 400 incidents recorded worldwide between 1980 and 1984, none 
occurred in East Africa.102 IMO statistics for the late 1980s and early 1990s closely 
match the more detailed data from Anti-Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM) compiled 
by FAS, beginning with 1985.103 ASAM data show that acts of piracy in the region were 
                                                 
98 Roger Villar, Piracy Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea since 1980 (London: Conway Maritime 
Press, 1985), 10. 
99 Poten & Partners, “Pirates Threaten Ship Traffic In Gulf of Aden,” LNG in World Markets, 2008, 
http://www.poten.com/search.aspx?query=pirates%20threaten%20ship%20traffic%20in%20gulf%20of%2
0aden  (accessed October 4, 2010). 
100 “Report on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships; MSC Circular 785,” International 
Maritime Organization, March 17, 1997. 
101 Villar, Piracy Today. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program,  
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pirates.htm.  
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extremely rare.  Indeed, no attacks were recorded in any year except 1989 (4) and 1991 
(2).  Four of the six attacks were by an organized rebel group, the Somali National 
Movement (SNM), vying for power ashore. In the SNM attack of December 11, 1989, the 
Italian commercial vessel Kwanda was captured and emptied of its 350 tons of fuel and 
food reserves.104 Aside from these politically motivated incidents, two more were 
recorded, both involving attacks by unidentified armed men in gunboats against 
commercial vessels. In one of these two cases three crew members were killed by the 
attackers and their surviving colleagues were forced to jump overboard.105 In the other, 
the attack was unsuccessful due to the commercial vessel’s effective defensive 
measures.106  All six recorded acts of piracy occurred at a time of heightened political 
tensions ashore and included the use of firearms.  
Other regions of the world with higher incidences of piracy (e.g., Southeast Asia, 
West Africa) never saw such widespread and systematic use of firearms in pirate 
attacks.107 The possession of weapons, apart from offering personal protection, has 
always been a status symbol within the Somali society.108 Furthermore, Somalia’s porous 
borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, coupled with years of instability preceding the collapse 
of the Siad Barre regime made it easy even for non-militiamen to acquire weapons.109 So, 
the unidentified armed men who carried out the two attacks—those not attributed to the 
SNM—could very well have been criminals taking advantage of the chaotic situation to 
make a profit, or members of any of the insurgent groups looking for personal gain.  
Firearms were not as readily available to coastal populations in Southeast Asia at the 
                                                 




107 In other regions machetes and knives were the weapons of choice; firearms were rarely used. 
Many of the recorded incidents were acts of robbery in which the intruders sought to avoid detection by, or 
confrontation with the crew. See Villar, Piracy Today. 
108 Francis Edukon Emathe, “Somalia: IGAD’s Attempt to Restore Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government,” Naval Postgraduate School, December 2006, 9-10, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA462459 (accessed October 10, 2010). 
109 For a detailed account of the political tensions within Somalia that led to Siad Barre’s overthrow, 
see Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, 231–63. 
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time, and the success rate of pirate attacks there was lower. The use of firearms in 
Somalia gave pirates an overwhelming advantage over civilian vessels, and this aspect 
would contribute in later years to unparalleled growth in Somali-based piracy.  
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Somali piracy was virtually nonexistent prior to 1989, and remained low through 
1991. However, fisheries were in perpetual transformation from 1975, heavily influenced 
by government policies, available technology, as well as environmental and social 
factors. At the time of state collapse ethnic Somalis outnumbered the Bajuni and Amarani 
fishermen and were the main actors in a profession they had shunned for centuries. There 
is no correlation, however, between the state of fisheries and the level of piracy in this 
period (Figure 2). When fisheries production declined in the early 1980s, one might have 
expected to see a rise in piracy, but this did not happen. Instead, the first acts of piracy 
occurred at a time when fisheries production was growing steadily.   
 
Figure 2.   Piracy and Fisheries in Somalia, 1980–1991. 110 
The argument that a decline in fisheries leads to a rise in piracy does not seem to 
apply here. The fact that there was no piracy reported before 1989 suggests that it would 
take more than a decline in fisheries to start piracy, and that the other necessary 
                                                 
110 The diagram is not drawn to scale, but it illustrates clearly the evolutionary patterns of piracy and 
fisheries before the collapse of the state. 
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conditions did not exist in the early 1980s. The onset of piracy, instead, seems to have 
required a rebellion. Though the SNM’s objectives were political in nature, its activities 
at sea showed how the possession and deployment of firearms could be used for profit 
against commercial shipping.  
The trends in Figure 2 do not suggest an inverse relationship, and there is no 
evidence of fishermen participating in the few acts of piracy that did occur in 1989 and 
1991, these being undertaken exclusively by armed rebels, either on behalf of an 
insurgent movement or for their own benefit. The attack on the Kwanda took place off 
the port of Zeila, also known as Saylac, near the border with Djibouti, around which there 
were no big fishing communities at the time.111 Other attacks, including the one in which 
crewmembers were killed, occurred around Cape Guardafui where there existed many 
fishing villages, but the attacks were all launched from gunboats, and there was no 
evidence of fishermen involvement.112  
Despite firearms being identified as an important characteristic of Somali-based 
piracy, it is important to note that piracy managed to grow elsewhere (in Southeast Asia 
and West Africa) without them. The next chapter looks at the evolution of piracy and 
fisheries within the unique conditions of statelessness in Somalia. 
 
                                                 
111 The FAO report by Van Zalinge shows a list of the important fishing communities (P.4) and their 
locations on the Somali coast (P.7). http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/SOM/profile.htm.  
112 1989-91 ASAM Reports. 
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III. SOMALIA: PIRACY AND FISHERIES AFTER STATE 
COLLAPSE 1991–2004 
A. INTRODUCTION 
President Siad Barre fled Somalia in January 1991, and by the end of that year all 
state institutions had collapsed. The different rebel factions could not agree on a power 
sharing deal, and none was strong enough to assume complete control of the country.113 
To the north, the Isaq-dominated entity of Somaliland broke away and declared its 
independence in May 1991, while in the rest of the country widespread violence and 
famine combined to produce one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Hordes of 
refugees poured into neighboring countries and many of those trapped within Somalia 
were dying of starvation.114 The international community, through the UN and several 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), decided to send in humanitarian aid, but the 
convoys of food and medical supplies soon became targets for the rebels. A U.S.-led UN 
force was then sent in with a humanitarian mandate to protect the distribution of aid, but 
this force got embroiled in the factional violence leading up to the incidents of October 
1993 when 18 U.S. servicemen were killed.115 A swift withdrawal by U.S. forces 
followed and the last UN contingent left Somalia in early 1995. The premature 
termination of the international intervention left Somalia in total desolation and at the 
mercy of warlords. 
The collapse of the state in 1991, and the continued absence of a central 
government thereafter, has had a tremendous impact on various aspects of life in 
Somalia. This chapter explores the evolution of piracy and fisheries in Somalia between 
1991 and 2004 to see whether there is a correlation between the two. The break in 2004 is 
prompted by the fact that in December of that year a tsunami originating off the island of 
                                                 
113 Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, 262-5. 
114 Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali. As many as 300,000 Somalis died from starvation before 
the arrival of foreign aid.  
115 Mark Bowden, “Black Hawk Down,” The Philadelphia Enquirer, November 16, 1997, 
http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp (accessed July 20, 2010). 
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Sumatra reached villages along the Somali coast, and its effects on fisheries and piracy 
will be investigated separately in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 3.   Map of Somalia—March 2004. 116 
                                                 
116 There are contested borders between Somaliland and Puntland to the north, and also between 
Somalia and Ethiopia to the Southwest. Map Copied from Florian Bruyas, “ Somaliland – Puntland State of 
Somalia,” UN Habitat, http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/4417_21585_somaliland.pdf (accessed 
October 27, 2010). 
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B. FISHERIES IN SOMALIA: 1991–2004 
1. Foreign Aid 
A big challenge posed by the collapse of government institutions was the 
channeling of foreign aid. Somalia had always been highly dependent on foreign aid, 
which generated $2.8 billion between 1972 and 1989, and from which it pulled 90 
percent of its investment budget.117 This made it the biggest beneficiary of foreign aid 
per capita in Africa and only second after Israel in the world.118 By 1982, foreign aid to 
Somali fisheries alone had exceeded $22 million and several international agencies were 
working on different projects with the government to improve the fisheries sector.119 
Although most of the money from foreign aid channeled through the government was not 
reaching the target population,120 so that the demise of the state was not a big loss in that 
regard, the fisheries sector was benefitting from direct investment from foreign agencies 
in the form of infrastructure and equipment donations.  
Most international aid agencies left Somalia as a result of the insecurity that 
prevailed, especially after the departure of UN forces in 1995. Only the EU continued to 
carry out assistance projects, but it limited its activities to those areas with relative 
security and some form of local community governance.121 Between 1991 and 1995 
international agencies and local NGOs were mainly focused on providing basic 
necessities like food, water, and medical supplies to vulnerable populations caught up in 
the fighting. Many coastal fishing communities were left wanting, mainly due to their 
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inaccessibility, even though they were among the hardest hit.122 The EU, by far the 
biggest contributor of aid to Somalia, was financing projects worth about $105 million in 
2001, but only $887,000 of that total benefited the fisheries sector.123 This was quite a 
drop from the $22 million spent on fisheries in the early 1980s. 
2. Support Infrastructure 
Another way in which state collapse impacted Somali fisheries was the near 
complete destruction of land-based support infrastructure.124 Cold rooms, fish processing 
centers, and boat construction and repair units were either destroyed or their equipment 
was stolen. Conservation deteriorated and this reduced the fishing communities’ capacity 
for foreign trade. Whereas Somali fish products had been exported as far as Asia and 
Europe prior to 1991, the postwar market was limited to Dubai (United Arab Emirates) 
and neighboring Kenya, where traders could guarantee same day delivery.125 The 
absence of conservation facilities also meant that post-catch losses were extremely 
high—about 50 percent overall, and up to 71 percent for captured sharks.126 This 
precarious market situation made the fishermen more desperate to sell and the traders 
(middlemen) less willing to pay a fair price—giving excessive power to the latter in the 
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commercialization of fishery products.127 The artisanal sector was a lot more dependent 
on land-based infrastructure—cold rooms and processing centers—and therefore suffered 
more from its destruction.128 Mismanagement of resources and lack of external support 
crippled many of the cooperatives that existed prior to 1991. By 2004, only six 
cooperative-like structures existed in central and southern Somalia, and they attracted 
very few fishermen due to their limited ability to provide assistance.129 Of all the fishing 
communities in central and southern Somalia only Mareeg had retained its prewar storage 
facility. By 2004 some of the other processing facilities had been rehabilitated, but were 
still too few to overcome the huge conservation problem.130  
Apart from these collective arrangements, a good number of privately-owned 
businesses set up shop in the more peaceful areas, like Puntland, to take advantage of the 
growing lobster and shark export market.131 Boat construction and repair capacity was 
completely destroyed in the early 1990s and was never fully re-established afterward, 
except for wooden boats. This increased costs and extended the time fishermen stayed 
away from sea, as they had to import spare parts and carry out repairs themselves.  
3. IUU Fishing 
State collapse also led to an exponential increase in the number of foreign 
poachers within Somali waters, and this in turn had a tremendous impact on artisanal 
fisheries. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing poses social, economic, and 
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environmental problems, especially in developing countries.132 Maintaining a 
Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) capability is quite expensive, and many 
coastal countries do not recognize its benefits until they suffer the ills of IUU fishing. 
Somalia had some MCS capability in the form of a navy, but it had not been able to 
prevent IUU fishing before 1991.133 So the collapse of the state only made this existing 
problem much worse, even though the effects of IUU fishing were not felt until after the 
departure of UN forces from Somalia.134 Relatively few in number prior to state collapse, 
the number of IUU vessels off the coast of Puntland alone had risen to about 300 by 
1998;135 by 2004 this number was up to 700 for the entire Somali coast, and their total 
catch was valued at about $94 million per year.136 Aside from this huge loss in potential 
revenue, Somalia suffered from IUU fishing through the depletion of its fish stocks and 
the degradation of its marine environment.137 Moreover, IUU fishing had a significant 
direct impact on Somalia’s fishing communities. Most of the foreign vessels had struck 
deals with local warlords, or were in possession of fishing licenses from sources that 
were undoubtedly dubious since Somalia no longer had an official licensing 
institution.138  
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The possession of these documents and the permission of some of the warlords 
emboldened foreign fishing vessels to venture closer to shore, into areas traditionally 
reserved for artisanal fishing, and this frequently resulted in clashes with the locals. As 
early as 1995 there were complaints, channeled up to the UN and other international 
organizations, by artisanal fishermen of their nets being torn and their boats crushed by 
bigger foreign fishing vessels, resulting occasionally in the loss of life.139 As these 
clashes became more frequent, rival militia groups intervened either on behalf of local 
fishermen, or to protect those vessels for which their leaders had received levies.140 The 
presence of militiamen at sea and the concomitant introduction of weapons made the 
clashes between foreign vessels and locals more dangerous. Some of the foreign vessels 
were seized and only released after the payment of ransom, and this pushed many of them 
to acquire weapons for protection.141  
Some of the artisanal fishermen likewise acquired weapons—readily available in 
lawless post-1991 Somalia—but they still found it hard to compete with the larger and 
better equipped IUU vessels.142 A major consequence of the escalation of violence at sea 
was that artisanal fishermen were pushed much closer to shore. Artisanal fishing grounds, 
which were judged to be sparsely occupied and underexploited prior to 1991, were 
suddenly overcrowded leading to the unsustainable exploitation of certain species.143   
                                                 
139 Mohamed Abshir Waldo, “The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the World Ignores the Other?” 
American Chronicle, January 7, 2009, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/87075 (accessed 
May 8, 2010). 
140 “Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1425 (2002),” 
P44. 
141 “Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1474 (2003),” 
United Nations Organization, March 25, 2003, 34,  
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2003.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/ACOS-64C9YU-unsc-
som-04nov.pdf/$File/unsc-som-04nov.pdf (accessed July 20, 2010). 
142 Andrew Mwangura, “Somalia: Pirates or Protectors?” Pambazuka News, May 20, 2010,  
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/64575 (accessed May 24, 2010). 
143 “Pirates and Profiteers : How Pirate Fishing Fleets are Robbing People and Oceans,” 
Environmental Justice Foundation, 2005, 7, http://www.ejfoundation.org/pdf/pirates_and_profiteers.pdf 
(accessed July 30, 2010). 
 30
4. Migration 
Overcrowding of artisanal fishing grounds after state collapse was not the result 
of IUU fishing alone. Migration patterns played a huge role, prompted by security 
concerns, as well as economic and environmental factors. During the civil war entire 
fishing villages were deserted in southern Somalia and in the northern districts of present 
day Somaliland.144 Many fishermen crossed into Kenya and Ethiopia, while others stayed 
in Somalia and migrated to fishing communities in more peaceful areas.145  
During this period, agricultural communities were frequently raided and their 
food stocks confiscated by any of the many factions vying for power in the south. The 
general insecurity soon brought a halt to farming activities and took away the livelihoods 
of a sizeable portion of the population. Pastoralists suffered a similar fate. Continual 
fighting disrupted the movement of cattle, and frequently meant that herdsmen could 
neither find grazing grounds for their herds, nor have access to the all-important export 
market. Then, just as the fighting began to die down in many areas, a ban by Saudi 
Arabia in 1998 on the import of Somali livestock, due to fears of Rift Valley fever, dealt 
a further blow to the livestock sector.146 This coincided with a period of severe droughts 
followed by floods in 1997 and 1998, which wiped out as much as 95 percent of the 
camel and goat herds in some areas.147 The cycle of floods, Rift Valley fever, and a ban 
on livestock exports would be repeated again barely two years later.148 Many of the 
affected pastoralists thus turned to fishering, full-time or part-time, to guarantee a source 
of livelihood.149  
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The conversion to fishing was made easier by the booming and rewarding lobster 
export market, especially in Puntland.150 As calm returned to certain regions, formerly 
deserted fishing villages were progressively repopulated and some eventually became 
overpopulated. Separate reports by the FAO, UN Development Program (UNDP), and the 
World Bank found that the total population engaged in artisanal fisheries in 2004 
numbered about 35,000.151 This number is substantially less than the 90,000 estimated 
for prewar years, but it resulted in a much higher population density considering that 
artisanal fishermen were confined to a smaller area in 2004 due to fear of violence from 
clan militias and fundamentalists and avoidance of confrontations with the larger IUU 
fleet vessels.152  
Overcrowding of artisanal fishing waters and the consequent over-fishing of 
certain species, such as lobsters and sharks, led to their depletion. By 2004, average daily 
catches for lobster had decreased by as much as 90 percent from the preceding decade, 
and its market was estimated to be very close to collapse.153 The decline in lobster 
production, which started around 1997, pushed fishermen to engage in year-round fishing 
to make up for their losses, and this only intensified the rate of depletion.154 The 
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depletion rate for lobster was substantially higher than that of other species, but overall 
the artisanal catch was still down by about 30 percent from its 1995 value.155   
5. Industrial Sector 
The discussion thus far has focused on the artisanal sector, but there had also been 
a thriving industrial sector prior to state collapse (see Chapter II). However, the industrial 
sector was so dependent on the state for licensing and joint ventures that it basically fell 
apart when state institutions collapsed in 1991. Licensed vessels were required to report 
the quantity and quality of their catch to the MFMR, but they all landed their harvest in 
foreign ports. Their activities, therefore, were not greatly hampered by the chaos that 
prevailed ashore in Somalia except that they lost their legitimacy, and, for all practical 
purposes, became indistinguishable from the hundreds of other IUU vessels in Somali 
waters. Although the exact fate of these formerly-legitimate vessels is not known, this is 
irrelevant to this thesis since these vessels employed very few Somalis and did not 
interact much with coastal communities. The only big loss was the licensing fee these 
vessels used to pay to the former regime. As discussed above, state investment in 
fisheries was minimal, so it is safe to say that any additional fees from them would not 
necessarily have benefitted the fisheries sector. One exception was SHIFCO, a state 
owned business. In fact, it was the only tentity associated with the Siad Barre regime that 
stayed standing long after 1991.156 SHIFCO’s five trawlers continued to fly the Somali 
flag and fish in Somali waters, undertaking regular 45-day expeditions, but their 
homeport was moved to Aden (Yemen).157 Following state collapse, the last government-
nominated Chairman and Chief executive Officer of SHIFCO, Farah Munyah, 
                                                 
155 There are no national fisheries statistics available after 1991 and these figures are estimates based 
on input from fishermen and local businesses. Burale, “FAO Post Tsunami Assessment Mission to Central 
and South Coast of Somalia,” 2. 
156 Kulmiye, “Militia vs Trawlers: Who is the Villain?” The East African Magazine. 
157 SHIFCO vessels landed all their catch in Aden before export to Europe and the Middle East. All 
ship repairs were also carried out in Aden. “Final Mission Report: Somalia – SHIFCO,” European 
Commission. 
 33
transformed this former para-statal into his privately-run enterprise.158 There are at least 
four instances when SHIFCO vessels were captured for ransom by Somali armed men 
despite, or maybe because of, the fact that they flew the Somali ensign.159 Since their 
catches no longer benefitted the Somali people in general, the SHIFCO vessels were 
probably considered to be part of the loathed IUU fleet.   
6. Trends in Fish Production 
FAO statistics show that the fisheries sector survived, and even thrived through 
the 1990s at a time when violence and widespread famine had crippled the mainstays of 
the national economy, notably agriculture and livestock.160 Fish production reached an 
all-time high in 1995, and, even when the sector later struggled, annual production never 
went below 20,000 tons (see Table 2).  
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
22,295 23,500 25,500 27,500 29,600 27,700 25,800 23,900 
        
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
22,000 24,500 20,600 27,300 28,800 29,800 29,800 29,800 
Table 2.   Somalia—Total annual marine fish capture: 1990–2005 (measured in metric 
tons).  161 
However, these figures do not paint a clear picture if one considers the following. 
First, the collection of fisheries data in Somalia was already problematic before state 
collapse and became even more so in the chaos that ensued. In a study carried out in the 
early 1980s both national and international marine statisticians identified some critical 
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factors that hampered the collection of fisheries data along the coast, including restricted 
access to landing sites and non-cooperation from many fishermen.162 Adding to these 
factors after 1991 was the disappearance of the MFMR—the regulatory body through 
which the government had controlled artisanal fishing cooperatives, issued licenses for 
industrial fishing, and collected data on fish production from the artisanal and industrial 
sectors. Even well-structured agencies of the UN, such as the FAO and the UN 
Environmental Program (UNEP), had relied to some extent on the Somali government to 
coordinate their activities on the ground, and typically used statistical inputs from the 
MFMR to construct their databases.  
Second, it is important to note that FAO national fisheries statistics are collected 
from a variety of sources, such as specialized state institutions, regional fishery 
organizations, and international trade bodies.163 The data is then validated through 
consultations, comparative intelligence, and expert advice.164 SHIFCO vessels, for 
example, reported their catch to the European Commission on a regular basis,165 and 
vessels from EU member states reported their catches from Somali waters to the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) at least until 2003.166 Organizations such as the 
International Trade Center (ITC) also collected data from countries worldwide on imports 
and exports of Somali goods.167 All these data were processed by FAO and adjusted to 
account for unreported catches.  
Thus, annual production figures in Table 3 reflect more than the catch of 
Somalia’s artisanal fishermen. The contribution of artisanal fisheries to the total output is 
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critical since the objective here is to evaluate the impact of state collapse on production 
levels and thus on coastal fishing communities. In the absence of a national fisheries 
policy after state collapse, it would appear that fisheries evolved unevenly along the 
Somali coast. In Somaliland, for example, fishing communities were completely 
depopulated during the years of the civil war, and fish production was close to nil. In 
2004 the region counted about 2,600 fishermen, and production was less than 10 percent 
of its prewar value.168 Even without exact prewar figures for the number of fishermen 
and the size of the annual catch per region, it would be accurate to conclude that the 
growth of fisheries in Somaliland was stunted after 1991. After Somaliland broke away in 
1991, the relative peace there enabled its predominantly pastoral population to continue 
its trade, and the livestock sector remained the main source of revenue for about 65 
percent of the population.169 Unlike those in the war-torn south, pastoral nomads in 
Somaliland did not feel the need to turn to fishing.  
Conversely, in Puntland, artisanal fisheries experienced explosive growth after an 
initial slump during the civil war years. Production reached a peak of 15,000 metric tons 
(MT) in 1995—about double the figure in the prewar years170—and stabilized at that 
value for a couple of years before declining to about 11,000 MT in 2004.171 The relative 
boom in fisheries in Puntland could be attributed to two factors. First, many more 
fishermen resettled in Puntland after the war than in Somaliland.172 Second, the less rigid 
administrative structure in Puntland made it easier for Somalis and Middle Eastern 
traders to establish businesses and deal directly with local fishermen.  
Though there are no production figures for central and southern Somalia during 
this period, complaints by fishermen indicated that there was a decline of more than 70 
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percent in catches between 1995 and 2005.173 This rate of decline was about twice that of 
Puntland, and this may be attributed to the greater number of fishermen and bigger post-
catch losses resulting from far less access to export markets due to insecurity.174 The 
chart below is constructed based on Puntland statistics alone, but the trend it shows 
would be similar for central and southern Somalia, except that the decline rate after 1997 
would be twice as great. For the purpose of this study, and based on the unavailability of 
specific production statistics for central and southern Somalia, it is assumed that the chart 
in Figure 4 is representative of all areas except Somaliland. Somaliland is excluded for 
two main reasons. Firstly, the number of fishermen there remained low and production 
rose to only about 10 percent of its prewar value. There was no decline, at least not to a 
point where it would justify a resort to piracy. Secondly, there was no piracy in 
Somaliland waters after 1991. The exclusion of Somaliland does not detract from the 
purpose of this thesis, which aims at comparing piracy and fisheries where both occur.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Puntland—Artisanal fish production 1991–2004. 
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C. PIRACY IN SOMALIA: 1991–2004 
There was a marked increase in pirate activities within Somali waters between 
1991 and 2004. Virtually nonexistent in previous decades, piracy off Somalia slowly 
developed into a permanent, but limited, threat in the 1990s. While the number of attacks 
stayed relatively low up to 2004, Somali piracy attracted international attention because 
of the tactics and weapons employed. There was a fair bit of looting, as in other areas, but 
piracy here distinguished itself mostly by pirates’ preference for kidnappings and ransom 
demands, as well as their systematic use of firearms. These characteristics of Somali 
piracy were the consequence of the chaos ashore where huge stockpiles of government 
weapons—accumulated from years of military cooperation with the Soviet Union and 
later the U.S.—had fallen into the hands of different militia groups. The porous borders 
with Kenya and especially Ethiopia exacerbated the problem by allowing the influx of 
small arms from Somalia’s unstable neighbors.175 The IMO and the IMB established 
piracy tracking mechanisms in the early 1990s that greatly reduced, though did not 
completely resolve, the issues of under-reporting noted in previous decades.176 There 
were slight differences in the statistics published by these organizations, most likely due 
to their different definitions of what constitutes piracy, but the trends they revealed were 
remarkably similar.177  
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Figure 5.   Somalia—Piracy Trends 1991–2004. 178 
The spike in pirate activity noted in 1995 could be due to a number of factors. 
First, it was in March of that year that UN forces, including a strong naval component,179 
finally left Somalia. While in Somali waters, the international navies represented a potent 
deterrent and maritime law enforcement authority. Their departure paved the way for 
unrestricted sea patrols by different militias empowered by their gains on land, each eager 
to inherit the authority of the defunct state.180 Second, the number of IUU vessels in 
Somali waters increased considerably immediately after the departure of UN forces, and 
this period coincides with the first recorded confrontations between IUU vessels and local 
fishermen. Nonetheless, the various reports show that most of the vessels attacked that 
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year were not fishing vessels.181 Also, two of the fourteen incidents reported by IMB that 
year were simply radar sightings of suspicious small boat activity. This does not take 
away from the fact that 1995 was an important year for piracy off the Somali coast. From 
then on, piracy was a permanent fixture in Somali waters. The spike in 1995 prompted 
the IMO and other international maritime agencies to start issuing warnings to mariners 
to stay as far away from the Somali coast as possible, and advising ships in transit to be 
alert and adopt evasive maneuvers when approached in the area. Consequently, the 
number of attacks dropped, but slowly rose again to another peak in 1999. By this time 
the pirates were better equipped and organized to extend their reach beyond the 12-
nautical-mile (NM) range. Whereas the attacks in 1995 had occurred quite close to shore, 
by 2000 the pirates could reach vessels as far out as 80 NM.182  
1. Targets and Tactics 
From the outset Somali pirates seemed to be indiscriminate in their choice of 
targets, and this would not change over time. Container ships, bulk carriers, sail boats, 
fishing vessels, and yachts were all among the victims. Regardless of whether the 
assailants claimed to be part of a Coast Guard, the end result of a successful boarding was 
the same: the ship and crew were systematically stripped of goods, personal belongings, 
and cash. If the conditions were right, the ship was hijacked and kept until ransom was 
paid by its owners. With respect to tactics, Somali pirates preferred to use force instead of 
stealth to board vessels.183 Almost always shots were fired, and occasionally the vessel 
was damaged or the crew wounded. The pirates’ weapons of choice were firearms and 
Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), which they seemed to possess in great quantities, but 
they nonetheless aborted attacks when faced with resistance from an alert crew. Some 
                                                 
181 “1995 Anti – Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM) report.” Many attacks on IUU vessels went 
unreported because these vessels did not want to disclose their illegal activities. Ironically, two SHIFCO 
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182 “2000 IMB Annual Piracy Report,” ICC International Maritime Bureau, January 2001. 
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using less lethal weapons and pirates generally avoided confrontations with the crew. “IMB Annual Piracy 
Reports,” 1992 – 2004; “ASAM Reports,” 1991 – 1999.” 
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ships fired back at the pirates or simply mustered the crew and activated their fire hoses, 
but the most effective defensive measure proved to be speed. Many attacks were averted 
by vessels simply changing course and increasing their speed to 12 knots.184  
The pirates employed a variety of small crafts, fitted with low horsepower 
outboard engines that could not keep up with the bigger, faster vessels. Also, boarding 
maneuvers become extremely hazardous at high speeds, and therefore, risky for pirates to 
undertake even in those rare instances when they could outpace their victims. The pirates’ 
speed handicap is highlighted in one attack on the Merchant Vessel Bonsella in 1994. 
This vessel was fired upon and then boarded from a dhow, while transporting emergency 
aid to Somalia. The pirates explained to the crew that the Bonsella had been attacked 
because they, the pirates, needed a faster means to chase IUU fishing vessels in Somali 
waters. The Bonsella was released 6 days later after a couple of unsuccessful attacks on 
other ships.185 It, too, was stripped of its cargo and cash. 
2. Reorganization: The Business Model 
In 2004, more than a decade after state collapse, piracy off Somalia was still far 
less frequent than in neighboring countries with functioning governments, like Eritrea, 
Kenya, and Yemen.186 From a global perspective the occurrence of piracy in East Africa 
was quite low; only the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean had less piracy.187 Other 
than the systematic employment of deadly weapons Somali piracy was considered to be 
within acceptable levels for a country with such a long coastline. By 2004, however, it 
was showing signs of getting worse not in terms of frequency of occurrence, but rather in 
its organization. Piracy had evolved from random attacks at sea by clan-based militia to a 
fledgling business enterprise transcending clan lines.  
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Still dependent on warlords for protection, pirates under the new business model 
invested in more seaworthy boats, bigger engines, and training, and attracted recruits 
from different clans.188  Mohamed Abdi Hassan, a former government employee who 
started recruitments in 2003 in Harardhere, an area not previously known for its 
involvement in piracy, is credited with being the pioneer of the business model.189 The 
new breed of business-oriented pirates did not claim membership in any Coast Guard, but 
they nonetheless retained the grievances against IUU fishing, which assured them 
legitimacy at home. This reorganization set the foundation for rapid growth in piracy by 
creating a self-sustaining system in which gains from each attack were reinvested to 
make the next attack more effective.   
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This period (1991–2004) established the first direct link between piracy and 
fisheries. The relationship between these two activities was manifested in two ways. 
First, the grievances of local fishermen were used by militia groups to carry out acts of 
piracy for their personal benefit. Second, fishermen themselves picked up weapons and 
attacked vessels at sea. Prior to 1991, random isolated incidents of piracy were conducted 
by insurgent groups vying for power ashore. When the Siad Barre regime collapsed, the 
violence and lawlessness on land eventually spread out to sea, especially after UN forces 
left Somalia in 1995.  
When the quest for political power no longer provided the necessary motives to 
conduct sea patrols, militia groups took up the plight of local fishermen. They received 
proceeds from the licensing of foreign vessels, but used none of the funds to protect or 
develop fishery resources.190 Gen. Mohamed Abshir Musse, whose faction controlled 
Northeastern Somalia in the early 1990s, was the most vocal about the ills of IUU 
fishing. He wrote a letter of protest directly to the Italian Prime Minister, and his 
                                                 
188 Hansen, “Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden,” 23-4. 
189 Hansen, “Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden.” Puntland, and its Majerteen clan, was the main 
source of Somali-based piracy prior to 2004. 
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movement, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), was one of 12 factions that 
sent a joint statement of complaint to the UN and other international organizations about 
IUU fishing’s adverse effects on Somalia’s fishermen and its coastal environment.191 He 
was also among those who regularly received proceeds from the dubious licensing of 
fishing vessels, notably through Africa Fisheries Management (AFMET) run by the 
McAlister Elliot group.192 In 1997 the SSDF hijacked a Taiwanese fishing vessel, the 
MV Shen Kno II, and received $1 million for its release.193 This incident highlights the 
fact that even when motives were provided by the fisheries sector, piracy was still 
controlled by militia groups.  
After 1991 the involvement of local fishermen in piracy is clearly established. 
Their vessels, especially the Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) boats specifically designed 
for fishing, were regularly used to transport armed militiamen to sea.194 The fishermen’s 
boat handling skills and knowledge of the sea were important as the need to move farther 
from shore to intercept commercial vessels grew. Apart from the use of fishing boats in 
pirate attacks, there are many accounts of armed fishermen attacking vulnerable vessels. 
There was also a history of armed violence at sea between local fishermen from different 
clans, which made it easy for fishermen to become pirates and for pirates to hide among 
fishermen. 195 Further proof of fishermen’s involvement in piracy is documented in a 
field study by Hansen that found two former lobster companies in Puntland involved 
exclusively in piracy.196 The exact dates of their switching to piracy are not stated, but 
this probably happened after 2000 when lobster earnings in the region had fallen 
considerably. 
The main grievance of local fishermen against IUU fishing vessels in the early 
years was the destruction of their nets and boats and the occasional loss of life. Adding to 
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this was the general frustration of watching helplessly as foreign vessels claimed 
Somalia’snational riches. Somalis, even those in non-fishing communities, felt that they 
were being taken advantage of by foreign fishing vessels at a time when they were most 
vulnerable. If these two were legitimate grievances in the early 1990s, the depletion of 
artisanal fishery resources was not, since it happened slowly over the course of a decade. 
Furthermore, the discussions above showed that the depletion of lobster and shark stocks 
was due mostly to poor management and unsustainable exploitation by the artisanal 
fishermen themselves, and that foreign vessels only played an indirect role by pushing 
them much closer to shore.  
The need to protect local fishermen and their equipment or to protect national 
riches from foreign exploitation provided ample motive for Somalis to go after IUU 
fishing vessels, but it does not explain the numerous attacks on non-fishing vessels in 
transit more than 12 NM from shore.197 While the UNCLOS that governs all human 
activities in the maritime domain forbids any economic exploration and exploitation of 
resources within 200 NM of a coastal state’s shores without its approval, it clearly allows 
for freedom of movement, especially outside the 12 NM range of claimable territorial 
sea.198 By attacking non-fishing vessels in transit, Somali pirates made their grievances 
look more like excuses for their profit-seeking criminal activity.  
Both the IMO and the IMB construct their data based on reports from victims of 
piracy, and one would expect underreporting by IUU vessels engaged in an illegal 
activity themselves. IUU vessels instead preferred to acquire weapons, buy protection 
from local militias, or pay a fine whenever hijacked. Nonetheless, other sources, drawing 
mostly from local accounts, show a large number of IUU fishing vessels attacked and 
many of them hijacked in Somali waters.199 Andrew Mwangura of the Mombasa-based 
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Seafarers Assistance Program contends that more than 50 of 104 captured vessels in 
Somali waters between 1991 and 2005 were fishing vessels.200 Some locals recognized 
the negative effects of piracy, but felt that if all the attacks on foreign fishing vessels 
were publicized, then piracy against non-fishing vessels would be considered a negligible 
side effect of their fight against IUU fishing. Irrespective of the account one prefers to 
believe on the number and type of vessels captured, it seems quite clear, considering all 
the different sources cited above, that hijackings during this period were done mostly by 
warlords—not fishermen—and most of the captured vessels were non-fishing vessels.  
State collapse definitely had an impact on piracy in Somali waters, with the rise in 
the number of attacks in the 1990s compared with previous decades. The lack of any state 
presence at sea permitted the invasion by IUU fishing vessels and the subsequent attempt 
by local groups to exercise authority in the name of protecting national assets. For both 
sides, in the absence of a state, the risks were considerably lower and the potential 
benefits high. Even though Somalia’s MSC capacity was low prior to 1991, a vessel 
caught engaging in IUU fishing could possibly be impounded and its crew jailed in 
Somalia.201 Without a state, an IUU fishing vessel’s only risk was the possibility of an 
attack by armed men against which it could retaliate, and if captured it could guarantee 
safety by paying a fee. For the armed local groups, too, the risk was almost nonexistent as 
they could use indiscriminate force at sea with impunity. Whenever they encountered a 
hard target all they had to do was turn away and find a softer one.  
So, the collapse of the state, because it created a vacuum at sea, set the conditions 
for piracy to rise. The rise in piracy, however, was only significant when compared with 
previous decades in Somalia. Nonexistent in the 1980s, piracy in Somalia grew a little in 
the 1990s, but was still quite low by global standards at the end of 2004. Piracy at this 
point was a novelty to most Somalis, and the unexpectedly high revenue derived from it, 
along with the licensing of foreign vessels were enough to satisfy the needs of the few 
warlords who were in control. Piracy was not yet the profit maximizing business that 
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Mohamed Abdi Hassan was trying to set up in central Somalia, and this is probably why 
attacks against commercial vessels in transit stayed relatively low. 
The dwindling number of economic opportunities after state collapse put 
tremendous pressure on the few sources of income that remained, with fisheries being the 
most attractive. As fisheries had been underexploited since independence, there was room 
to absorb the increased population pressure. However, the absence of any fishery 
management protocol led to the overexploitation of certain species after a few years of 
increased production. The decline in fisheries left many able-bodied men with no way to 
sustain their families and therefore exposed them to recruitment in criminal activities 
such as piracy. Frustration or the basic instinct for survival guided some Somali 
fishermen toward piracy, but they tended to be employees in a trade dominated by 
militiamen.  
If the economic status of artisanal fishermen was the determining factor in levels 
of piracy, one would expect piracy to rise during periods of low fish production, and fall 
during periods of high fish production. The analysis above, even though made with 
incomplete data, shows quite unequivocally that there was no inverse relationship 
between piracy and fisheries, at least during the 14 years following state collapse. Apart 
from one discrepancy seen in 1996, there seemed instead to be a direct relationship 
between the two—both were low in the early 1990s, rose suddenly in the mid-1990s, and 
then declined at different rates up to 2004 (see Figure 6). Though only Puntland fisheries 
data was used in this analysis, it still reflected the general trends of piracy and fisheries in 
Somalia, since both activities were predominant in this area and absent or low in the rest 
of Somalia.  
 
Figure 6.   Somalia—Trends in piracy and fisheries after 1991. 
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IV. SOMALIA: FISHERIES AND PIRACY AFTER THE TSUNAMI 
2005–2010 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On December 26, 2004, a powerful underwater earthquake off the island of 
Sumatra, measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale, generated gigantic waves that devastated 
communities on the eastern and western borders of the Indian Ocean.202 The effects of 
this tsunami were far more serious in Asia, but the waves were still strong enough to 
cause considerable damage by the time they made landfall in East Africa, more than 7000 
kilometers from the earthquake’s epicenter.203 Somalia was the hardest hit country in 
Africa, recording 289 deaths with about 44,000 more left in urgent need of food, potable 
water, healthcare, and shelter.204 Coastal and island communities in Somalia were 
affected, as far south as the Kenyan border and as far north as Cape Guardafui in 
Puntland. Today, many of them are still struggling to recover from the disaster with 
progress greatly hampered by the already complicated political, economic, and security 
issues prevailing within Somalia since 1991. 
Fisheries and maritime piracy are both launched from, and are heavily dependent 
on, coastal communities, but this does not imply that the two activities are necessarily 
related. Though the grievances of local fishermen were used after 1991 to justify attacks 
at sea, trends in piracy and fisheries prior to the tsunami did not show an inverse 
relationship between the two (see Chapter III). This chapter looks at how each of these 
activities was affected by the 2004 tsunami, and investigates whether a more direct 
relationship developed between them thereafter.  
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 48
The discussion will focus on the semi-autonomous entity of Puntland, as well as 
Central and South Somalia. The breakaway Republic of Somaliland will be left out for 
three main reasons. First, its geographic location, away from the Indian Ocean, meant 
that it was shielded from the devastating effects of the tsunami. Second, fisheries there 
never constituted a significant part of Somaliland’s economy due to the predominantly 
pastoral culture of its population (see Chapter III). Third, piracy off the Somaliland coast, 
which was conducted by the SNM as a tactic of insurgency in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (see Chapter II), practically ceased soon after independence. The Somaliland 
authorities have since been successful in clamping down on piracy within their waters 
originating mostly from outside groups.205 
B. FISHERIES IN SOMALIA AFTER THE TSUNAMI 
Artisanal fish production was already on the decline before the tsunami, but it still 
generated revenues sufficient to sustain the many households that depended on it. The 
decline was blamed on the rapid depletion of stocks due to unsustainable exploitation, 
and the tsunami made this situation worse by destroying fishing equipment and land-
based infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami about 44,000 people lost 
their source of livelihood and were in urgent need of external assistance. Due to 
Somalia’s isolation from the outside world and the inaccessibility of many of its coastal 
villages, the dire situation in fishing communities was not known until three days after 
the event. The first supplies of food and potable water came on the 30th of December 
from European forces in neighboring Djibouti, as well as from the WFP.206 After initial 
assessments by a joint international interagency team, it was realized that most of the 
affected population would have to be sustained via external aid until the next fishing 
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season, which was ten months away.207 During this period, repair and replacement of 
damaged fishing gear was made a priority in order to facilitate a return to normalcy for 
the fishermen. International organizations and aid agencies all echoed the need to rebuild 
better communities, and saw post-tsunami reconstruction as an opportunity to fix fishing 
villages that had suffered from insecurity and neglect since 1991.208  
1. The Bajuni Community 
One group that required special attention was the Bajuni community in the south. 
The Bajuni are an ethnic minority with the longest history of fishing in Somalia. As 
successive droughts and civil war pushed many ethnic Somalis to resettle along the coast, 
the vulnerable Bajuni migrated to islands, such as Kayoma, Fuma, Mdoa, and Jula, off 
Kismayo where they felt relatively more secure.209 The tsunami destroyed their homes 
and fishing gear—about 200 boats and 5,000 nets—leaving this community of about 
13,500 totally despondent.210 Many moved to the mainland and settled into already 
existing Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps, and those who stayed behind were 
afraid to go back out to sea, still overwhelmed by the sudden devastation that had 
befallen them.211 Food, potable water, and sanitation were immediate needs, and aid 
supplies from the Red Cross, WFP, and the World Concern Development Organization 
(WCDO) helped to prevent starvation and the spread of disease on the mainland and 
islands in the south. By June 2005, WCDO had provided three months’ worth of food 
rations to more than 14,000 people, some shelter and enough fishing gear for 300 Bajuni 
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families to resume their trade.212 Given that this represented only 1/9 of the total 
population, the efforts of aid organizations in the south were quite commendable, but fell 
well short of expectations mostly due to the long-standing climate of insecurity in and 
around Kismayo. 
2. Central and Southern Somalia 
Between June and August 2005, a team from the FAO visited more than 30 
fishing communities in central and south Somalia to assess the impact of the tsunami 
there.213 This team found that though the impact of the tsunami was less severe than it 
was farther north in Puntland, the fisheries sector was still in dire need of assistance after 
years of insecurity and neglect. The team had to skip some fishing communities around 
areas such as Hobyo and Harardhere due to security concerns, but its findings reflected 
the general state of artisanal fisheries in coastal communities south of Puntland.214  
Out of a total of about 22,000 fishermen in central and southern Somalia, about 5 
percent (more than 1,000 men) had emigrated away from fishing villages after the 
tsunami, while many of the nearly 5,000 seasonal fishermen had already returned 
home.215 After many years of neglect there were few operational support infrastructures 
(see Chapter III), and these suffered little or no damage from the tsunami, except for a 
storage facility at Adale whose walls collapsed under pressure from the surging waves.216 
The greater damage was to fishing equipment present in the water or near the shore at the 
time of the tsunami. More than 800 boats (both wooden and fiberglass), about 300 
outboard engines, and 28,000 nets were either lost or in need of repairs.217 Although the 
amount of fishing equipment unaffected by the tsunami was not given in the assessment 
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report, it is very likely that some boats remained operational, since it would be difficult to 
imagine that 800 boats were enough to accommodate the reported 22,000 fishermen—
implying an average of more than 25 fishermen per boat. However, the loss of 28,000 
nets was quite significant and by itself could impede fishing even for those who still had 
boats and engines. Overall, it was estimated that artisanal fisheries in central and southern 
Somalia had suffered more from state collapse and the ensuing lawlessness than from the 
tsunami. Years of unsustainable exploitation, poor conservation techniques, lack of 
processing facilities, and limited access to markets all contributed to push artisanal 
fisheries ever closer to collapse, long before the tsunami came. 
3. Puntland 
The Northeastern coast of Somalia (Puntland) was where almost all 289 tsunami-
related deaths were registered, and also where the greatest destruction occurred. The town 
of Hafun, for example, was completely wiped out, and had to be rebuilt 500 meters inland 
from its original site.218 Along the 650-kilometer stretch of coastline between Garacad 
and Hafun in Puntland, a total of about 630 fishing boats were either lost or destroyed, 
and about 28,000 people were affected.219 The tsunami struck at the peak of the fishing 
season when the population density along the coast is made higher by the influx of 
seasonal fishermen. Since there was no hope for further harvest before the end of the 
season in April, these seasonal fishermen either moved back to their homes or migrated 
to city centers to find petty jobs that could help make up for the loss in expected fisheries 
revenue. The full-time fishermen were in a more desperate situation because they had 
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were left without the necessary equipment to continue fishing. An estimated 80 percent of 
their fishing equipment was destroyed, of which only 30 percent could eventually be 
repaired.220  
Fisheries in Puntland were on the decline before the tsunami, but catches had still 
been good enough to offer coastal populations as much as five times more revenue than 
their average compatriots elsewhere in the country.221 The tsunami brought the thriving 
fisheries trade to an abrupt halt, thereby making previously self-sufficient communities 
highly dependent on external aid. Permanent fishermen derived about 80 percent of their 
revenue directly from fisheries, while the remaining 20 percent came from shops and 
other small commercial enterprises run by women. Remittances from relatives abroad 
played a small role within these communities before the tsunami, but became vitally 
important to many families thereafter.222 Two months after the tsunami, only 25 percent 
of Puntland’s fishermen had returned to sea, eager to make the best out of the remaining 
few weeks of the fishing season. 223  
Despite its hugely negative impact, the tsunami had some positive consequences 
for Somali fisheries. Firstly, it generated world sympathy, permitting the return of foreign 
aid. Most of the aid agencies present in Somalia had closed shop after the departure of 
UN forces in 1995, and those who stayed behind focused on providing basic assistance—
food, water, and shelter—to IDPs. Aid to fisheries stayed insignificantly low over the 
years, leading to the rapid degradation of all support infrastructure. The tsunami put 
Somali fisheries back in the spotlight. Secondly, the adversity caused by the tsunami’s 
destruction forced local communities to pull together to better manage scarce collective 
resources, and therefore reinforced local governance in the absence of a national central 
authority. Thirdly, the tsunami interrupted the over-exploitation of certain species, such 
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as lobsters and sharks, which were already quite close to collapse.224  The ensuing 
months of minimal fishing activity definitely helped the regeneration of these two 
species, which were the basis of the coastal economy in Puntland. The short-term loss in 
revenue permitted the survival of species for longer term benefits. Interestingly, the 
tsunami interagency assessment team in Puntland found that only an estimated 30 percent 
of fishery stocks were being exploited, and that the choice of species harvested was 
driven by specific market demands.225 So, with better organization of the fisheries sector 
fishermen could diversify their catch and reduce the pressure on lobsters, sharks, and 
king fish. Also, the improvement of conservation techniques to minimize post-catch 
losses, and the development of markets for the other species, such as tuna and mackerel, 
would lead to a more sustainable exploitation of fishery resources, and thus take away the 
principal grievance that local fishermen had against IUU vessels—namely, the depletion 
of stocks. Applying aid to reshape the market structure for Somali fishery products would 
provide many challenges to international donors and reconstruction teams, especially 
since the traders who dominated the sector were quite happy with the existing distribution 
of roles.226  
4. Reconstruction 
After providing food, potable water, and sanitation to affected populations, the 
efforts of aid donors and reconstruction teams turned to the replacement of damaged 
equipment that would permit fishing communities to be self-sufficient again. It was 
apparent from the beginning that coordination was essential among the many 
participating agencies in order to avoid overlap, especially since available resources were 
deemed insufficient to meet the identified objectives.227 The Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA) was established by the Puntland authorities 
to coordinate all relief efforts there, but the lead role in implementation was assumed by 
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the FAO due to its long-standing expertise on fishery matters.  The FAO estimated that 
more than $3 million would be necessary to meet basic objectives,228 and submitted an 
initial demand for $1,925 million to the UN Flash Appeal set up to collect and distribute 
funds to all tsunami-affected countries.229 By October 2005, the start of the new fishing 
season, the FAO had already received about $1.4 million from various donors, and, 
working with the HADMA, was targeting 2,000 fishermen in 28 fishing villages.230 Even 
though funds were made available in a timely manner, many fishermen entered the new 
season in October still lacking essential gear mainly because the movement of people out 
of fishing communities in the off-season made it difficult to assess their collective needs. 
The available funds were eventually used to procure boats, engines, and fishing gear, and 
to train locals on fish handling and processing, the management of marine resources, and 
the repair of outboard engines. All these were vital to the reconstruction process, and by 
March 2006 the FAO had received a combined total of about $3.1 million, enabling it to 
reach even more communities.231  
The distribution of aid was made a lot easier in Puntland by the presence of 
government structures and a better security climate, but was greatly limited by the poor 
state of road infrastructure that made some areas almost inaccessible. Coordinating the 
distribution of aid also proved to be a challenge as some organizations provided 
equipment to certain fishing communities without proper assessment and consultations. 
For example, in August 2005, the NGO United Nations Association (UNA) donated 11 
boats to Bender Beyla, seven of which were reportedly seized by traders from recipients 
who owed them money—a situation that could have been avoided had there been 
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coordination with other agencies and a preliminary assessment of the community’s 
market structure.232 The FAO, backed by Puntland authorities, went to great lengths to 
discourage the donation of lobster fishing equipment in order to protect this threatened 
species, much to the chagrin of traders and fishermen who hitherto depended on it. This 
measure could have facilitated a diversification of the catch, thereby contributing to the 
goal of sustainable exploitation of marine resources, but it was undermined by 
independent donors, such as CARE International, who provided lobster fishing gear 
directly to certain communities.233  
External actors succeeded in preventing a humanitarian catastrophe after the 
tsunami, but found it to be a far bigger challenge meeting the objective of rebuilding 
fishing communities to a standard higher than that of the pre-tsunami years. A large 
inflow of foreign aid permitted devastated communities like Hafun to be rebuilt from 
scratch, with houses, salt-free wells, processing centers, and a pier to host the donated 
boats.234 Other areas in Puntland, such as Bender Beyla, Garacad, and Eyl, also 
benefitted from the donation of boats, among other things, but two years after the tsunami 
fewer than 200 boats had been distributed to replace those destroyed.235 Granted, the new 
boats were bigger and meant to satisfy the collective needs of fishermen grouped into 
associations, but 200 was a relatively small number.  Equipment donated through the 
FAO and financed by funds from the UN Flash Appeal included only 60 fiberglass boats, 
which, by FAO’s own estimate, were about 100 boats shy of meeting the objectives in 
Puntland alone.236 The UN Flash Appeal set up for post-tsunami relief was closed in June 
2006,237 and though aid continued to flow into Somalia from other sources, the focus 
shifted back to the perennial problems of starvation and instability in the greater part of 
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the country. It was realized that fishing communities could not be stood up without 
addressing some of the bigger problems in Somalia. Better roads, for example, were an 
absolute necessity if fishermen were to have access to bigger markets and better storage 
and processing facilities. Some of these roads would have to go through insecure areas, 
and their construction would require funds and local political will far beyond the capacity 
of aid organizations. Considering, also, that Somalis are generally not very fond of fish, 
the main hope for the artisanal fishery sector was a vibrant export market that aid 
organizations could not reshape simply by operating within Somalia.  
Based on existing trends in demand, controlled by UAE and Somali traders in 
Dubai, certain species would continue to be ignored while others would be exploited to 
the point of extinction. Both the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and the TFG of 
Somalia have a Ministry of Fisheries, but neither is equipped to play the regulatory role 
that a sustainable management of marine resources requires. For starters, stocks needed to 
be assessed to determine which species were in danger. Local authorities lacked both 
qualified manpower and the material resources necessary to assess the quantity of fish 
landed by the artisanal fishermen,238 let alone that of the numerous industrial fishing 
vessels present in Somali waters.  
5. Trends in Fisheries Production 
Pre-tsunami annual artisanal fish production was estimated at 11,000 MT (see 
Chapter III). Immediately after the tsunami production fell sharply to about a quarter of 
its previous value due to lack of equipment and fear of the sea by many fishermen. 
Production then rose gradually until 2008, to about half of the pre-tsunami value, fueled 
by external aid donations in fishing equipment, storage and processing facilities, and 
training. The drastic reduction in aid to fisheries after 2007 meant that many of the pre-
tsunami fishermen continued to lack the necessary equipment to resume their trade, so 
production could not grow any further and is shown in Figure 7 to have leveled off after 
2008. 
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Figure 7.   Somalia—Artisanal fish production 2004–2009. 239 
C. PIRACY IN SOMALIA AFTER THE TSUNAMI 
1. Trends 
Since 2005, piracy incidents off the Somali coast have increased to levels 
unmatched anywhere or at any other time in history. At its peak in 2000, Southeast Asian 
piracy—in the waters off Indonesia, Malaysia, and in the Strait of Malacca—recorded a 
total of 215 incidents;240 by comparison, incidents attributed to Somali pirates in 2009 
alone numbered 217, more than half of the world total.241 The rise in Somali piracy has 
been quite significant in recent years (see Figure 8 below), growing not just in the 
frequency of incidents, but also in the sophistication of attacks and in the distance of 
operations from Somali shores. Attacks by Somali pirates were confined within a 100-
NM radius from land before the tsunami, but the range of attempted attacks quickly  
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increased from 165 NM in 2005 to 1,100 NM in March 2010.242 Vessels have been 
attacked as far south as the Seychelles, as far east as the Maldives, and as far north as the 
coast of Oman, in the Arabian Sea.243 
 
Figure 8.   Somalia—Piracy Trends 2004–2009. 
Piracy increased four-fold in 2005, and, apart from the dip in 2006, there has been 
an annual rise of about 100 percent ever since. The reduction in Somali-based pirate 
activity in 2006 has been largely attributed to the six-month rule of the Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU).244 The ICU was created in 2001 from the fusion of eleven clan-based 
Islamic courts, which had gained popularity within their respective communities by 
providing basic services and establishing a semblance of order under strict Islamic 
law.245 During its rule, characterized by the use of extreme measures, such as 
amputations and public executions, the ICU curtailed crime on land and dissuaded 
maritime piracy that it considered to be thievery.  
A demonstration of the ICU’s resolve to tackle piracy was seen in November 
2006 when its fighters stormed and liberated a hijacked ship and captured eight pirates 
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who were demanding a $1 million ransom.246 By June 2006, the ICU controlled most of 
southern and central Somalia, including Mogadishu, but was kicked out of power by a 
U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion in January of the following year. The ICU had been 
branded as a terrorist organization by the U.S., and some of its leaders were said to have 
ties to Al Qaeda. The ICU was replaced by a TFG, which has neither been able to garner 
popular support, nor expand its authority outside Mogadishu.247  
2. Toxic Waste Dumping 
Ample motives and opportunities for piracy off the Somali coast existed for many 
years before the tsunami (see Chapter III), but had not reached the level of attacks seen 
after 2004. The main factor cited by locals to explain the sudden rise in piracy since 2005 
has been the dumping of toxic wastes by foreign powers within Somali waters. Though 
allegations of toxic waste dumping date back to the early 1990s,248 it was after the 
tsunami that the phenomenon gained international recognition and drew widespread 
condemnation, including from the UN.249 Locals complained of containers washed 
ashore by the tsunami waves whose contents caused previously unknown skin and lung 
infections,250 and Nick Nuttal of UNEP highlighted the increased danger that Somalis 
were exposed to from toxic industrial wastes in the immediate aftermath of the 
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tsunami.251 However, a UN fact-finding team sent to investigate concluded that the 
reports were unsubstantiated. It found instead that poor sanitary conditions and the 
improper disposal of sewage and other hazardous materials by coastal populations in 
Somalia posed the biggest threat to their health.252 The report did not refute the dumping 
of wastes in Somali waters by foreign vessels, but it stated clearly that no diseases or 
environmental degradation in Somalia could be directly linked to it.  
Well-founded or not, the allegations of toxic waste dumping provided an 
additional means by which pirates reinforced the already strong legitimacy that they 
enjoyed within their local communities.253 Somalis generally feel that the ransom money 
pirates collect is little compensation for the many years of unabated exploitation by 
foreign powers, through IUU fishing and the dumping of toxic wastes.254 This argument 
has been used by many Somalis to justify attacks on all types of vessels, even those not 
involved in IUU fishing or toxic waste dumping.255 However, the pirates themselves are 
at a loss to explain why they hijack ships carrying relief supplies destined for Somalia. 
The first such hijacking occurred in June 2005 when a WFP-hired vessel carrying two 
months worth of food supplies to tsunami victims in Puntland was taken by pirates 32 
NM off the coastal town of Harardhere.256 This attack turned out not to have been a 
mistake, as many more aid-carrying vessels destined for Somalia were attacked in the 
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following years.257 Grievances surely had provided the earlier motives for piracy, but it 
was clearly now an enterprise driven by greed.258  
3. The Business of Piracy 
The idea of piracy as a profit-seeking business was hatched in Harardhere in 2003 
by Mohamed Abdi Hassan (see Chapter III), and by 2005 it had fully blossomed and was 
attracting recruits from far inland who had no previous maritime experience.259 Though 
Puntland continued to host some of the most successful pirate groups, communities 
farther south were fast catching up. Years of drought and rampant clan violence left 
coastal communities around Harardhere and Hobyo with virtually no economic 
opportunities. Furthermore, these struggling communities suffered some losses in fishing 
equipment during the tsunami, but, unlike other coastal communities in central Somalia, 
they did not benefit from post-tsunami aid due to their prevailing climate of insecurity.260  
Even in those areas where relative peace permitted some form of economic 
activity, able-bodied men could get only very low paying jobs due to their generally high 
levels of illiteracy.261 Piracy, and its promise of instant wealth at minimal personal risk, 
became a popular choice for many. Just one successful hijacking with a $1 million 
ransom payment could earn a pirate about $10,000—a life-changing sum he could not get 
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from any other source.262 Some of the ransom money was reinvested in equipment and 
logistics, and also used to pay off government and other local officials.263  
This business model turned out to be profitable for more than just the pirates who 
venture out to sea; the wider society benefits too, as the inflow of cash transforms 
previously destitute communities into “boomtowns.”264 In places like Harardhere, 
Hobyo, and Eyl, piracy is the only business in town; the pirates construct and live in 
modern houses, drive new cars, and, thanks to generators, bring electricity to areas that 
had been in the dark for more than 20 years. Businesses have also sprung up within these 
communities to cater to the pirates’ every need, from food for their hostages to the 
narcotic, qat, that the pirates consume in great quantities, especially during their long 
deployments at sea.265  
Piracy in Somalia employs about 5,000 men and provides indirect benefits to 
many more.266 The lucrative nature of piracy has tempted some to embark on individual 
missions, accompanied by relatives in their personal skiffs, but the greatest successes so 
far have been registered by organized groups. There are five main groups operating out of 
Eyl, Garacad, Hobyo, Harardhere, and Mogadishu—all coastal towns in Puntland and 
central Somalia.267 Some have been in business since 2005, and have shown a great 
capacity to adapt to their changing environment. 
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4. Change in Pirate Tactics 
The change in pirate tactics observed in recent years was influenced by the 
presence of international naval patrols, and made possible by the adaptive structure of the 
business model. Since 2008, an impressive armada of naval vessels from more than 
twenty countries, including the U.S., Russia, and China, patrols the waters off the HOA, 
but has not been able to curtail the rise in piracy.268 The forward-looking organizers of 
piracy have reinvested in tools—such as portable GPS devices and satellite phones—that 
enable their agents to get around the constraints of repression at sea.  They acquired 
bigger engines to overcome the speed deficit problem they had experienced in previous 
years (see Chapter III), and adopted the concept of a “mother ship” into their primary 
mode of operation. A mother ship offers three main advantages over small skiffs. First,, it 
is generally more seaworthy, providing more comfort and safety during long deployments 
on the open ocean. Second, it is big enough to accommodate the speedboats used in the 
final approach, and has enough room to store fuel, food and other supplies.269 The mother 
ship is thus an important logistics asset that does not only extend the range of operations, 
but also enables longer deployments away from home bases. Third, the mother ship is 
usually a fishing boat or a commercial vessel, and therefore blends in nicely with the 
normal maritime traffic in the area. It offers a deceptive cover, enabling the pirates to 
avoid detection by naval patrols and to guarantee an element of surprise by masking their 
intention from potential targets until they are close enough to launch an attack.  
The international naval presence and the increased vigilance onboard commercial 
vessels have made surprise a vital piece of successful pirate operations. The old tactics 
pirates used of approaching from miles away in small, low speed boats, firing warning 
shots and announcing their affiliation with the Somali Coast Guard would not have 
worked in this new environment, and the pirates were quick to adapt. Worth noting is that 
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most of the mother ships are involuntary participants in pirate operations, as they are 
captured, used, and then released after a successful mission, or when the ship or pirates 
run out of supplies.270 There have also been reports of secondary bases in Yemen where 
the Somali pirates can refuel and retool.271 This gives them extra safe havens, extends 
their reach, and prolongs their ability to stay at sea. This also makes analysis of their 
navigation patterns by naval surveillance difficult, as they do not always come from, or 
return to, Somalia. 
As to how the business model brought greater success to post-tsunami pirates than 
to militia groups in the 1990s, those groups were more interested in asserting their 
political authority on land, and attacked only those vessels from which their leaders had 
not received levies. As separate groups issued fake licenses to, and felt the need to 
protect, different vessels they eventually found themselves pitted against each other, 
thereby minimizing their otherwise huge potential for collective gain. Since these 
competing groups could not offer protection to the many vessels for which they received 
levies, this situation proved unsustainable over time. In contrast, the business model freed 
pirates of these constraints from the outset. They did not assume any Coast Guard duties, 
or the obligation to protect certain vessels. Their only objective was to make profit, and 
any target that held the promise of a ransom was considered fair game. Reinvesting in the 
business also increased the success rate of attacks and guaranteed growth in a way that 
the militia groups in the 1990s could not. 
As of September 2010, there were 22 commercial vessels under the control of 
Somali pirates—the highest number yet.272 Also, 529 hostages were taken in the first half 
of 2010, nineteen more than in the same period of 2009.273 At this rate, the 2010 annual 
figures for Somali piracy are bound to surpass the already record-setting numbers of 
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2009. Though counter-piracy efforts have scored some victories in recent months, it is 
quite clear that the pirates are still able to make a good living. Sitting next to 2.5 million 
square miles of waters with heavy maritime traffic,274 it seems the pirates will always 
have plenty of soft targets to prey on. The mandate of the EU counter-piracy mission—
Operation Atalanta—has been extended to December 2012,275 but it is difficult to predict 
how long the international community will be able or willing to sustain a strong naval 
presence in the area at the current collective cost of about $3 million a day.276 Overall, 
Somali piracy is costing the global economy more than $1 billion a year,277 and 
increasingly there is the recognition that repression at sea will not be sufficient. Though it 
is currently just an enterprise for profit, Somali piracy has the potential to fuel local wars, 
increase regional instability, and be exploited by international terrorist groups in order to 
inflict a bigger blow to the global economy.278 
D. ANALYSES AND CONCLUSION 
As the discussion above indicates, fisheries were on the decline after the 
tsunami—just as piracy was rising. The trends in Figure 9 do not show a direct inverse 
relationship between the two activities through the entire period, but 2005 definitely 
marked a turning point for both.  
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Figure 9.   Somalia—Trends in piracy and fisheries 2004–2009. 
Other factors affected the evolution of piracy and fisheries later on, but in 2005 
the profound impact of the tsunami on coastal communities seems to have played a 
determining role. Somalis have always used coping mechanisms to survive hardships 
brought about by man-made or natural disasters. This involves diversifying sources of 
revenue to ensure that there is always something a family can depend on for subsistence. 
Even before the civil war, pastoralists in fertile regions planted crops, and some 
traditional farmers reared goats or sheep.279 Along the coast, many went to sea during the 
fishing season, between October and April, and returned to other activities, such as 
farming or cattle rearing, in the off-season.280 As years of violence and successive 
droughts curtailed most economic alternatives, fishing increasingly became the most 
important part of many coastal families’ coping strategies.281 The devastating effects of 
the tsunami on Somali fisheries took away this last honest option, and pushed many, for 
the first time, to consider piracy as a means of survival.  
A year after the tsunami, only about 25 percent of Puntland’s fishermen had the 
necessary equipment—boats and nets—to go out to sea, meaning more than 7,000 were 
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out of work.282 Not all out-of-work fishermen converted to piracy, but many did, and 
today, unlike the pre-tsunami years, most of Somalia’s pirates have a fisheries 
background.283 Mohammed Yusuf Ali is representative of this switch.284 Just like many 
of his fishermen colleagues, this 33-year-old from Eyl lost his boat and fishing gear 
during the tsunami and sought recruitment in a pirate ring to support his family. Three 
years later, he was driving a brand new SUV and living in a mansion by the ocean.285  
The rapid distribution of food prevented starvation in the immediate aftermath of 
the tsunami, but it took a full year for the distribution of fishing equipment to go into 
effect in places such as Puntland, and even then some areas never received any aid, such 
as Hobyo and Harardhere. Furthermore, many businesses in coastal communities 
depended on fisheries and were therefore negatively affected by the predicament of the 
fishermen. These conditions meant that there were enough idle, homeless, and desperate 
men along the coast—at least in 2005—to fill the ranks of the growing piracy business.  
Like Ali and his friends from Eyl, many fishermen in other parts of Somalia 
similarly responded to the lure of piracy after the tsunami. Dahir Mohamed Hayeysi told 
the BBC how he and other fishermen in Harardhere switched to piracy in 2006 out of 
desperation.286 Life for them improved drastically after their first successful job, 
hijacking a WFP vessel in February 2007.287 In 2005, Farah Ismail Eid and five of his 
fellow fishermen traded their nets for AK-47s and set out to sea from the port of Garacad 
to attack foreign ships. Eid and his colleagues were arrested and jailed by Somaliland 
authorities in 2008, but he was unrepentant about his choice of switching to piracy.288  
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If the number of possible recruits determines the growth rate of piracy, then one 
would expect piracy to have shown exponential growth after state collapse in 1991. Back 
then there were plenty of idle, homeless, and desperate young men. During the 1990s, 
though, these men had more choices. Many of them joined militia groups or resorted to 
some form of crime; others chose to stay with their families and moved into camps 
dependent on aid from NGOs. Yet others migrated abroad, or to those areas within 
Somalia with greater stability and a few remaining economic options. Those who 
migrated to coastal communities, especially in Puntland, found a vibrant fishery sector 
capable of providing for their subsistence needs at the very least.289 There is evidence 
that the coastal population increased throughout the 1990s, and just before the tsunami it 
was found that inhabitants of fishing communities, especially in Puntland, earned as 
much as five times more than the average Somali.290 Because the new migrants to coastal 
communities could earn an honest living in fisheries, it is likely that the criminal act of 
piracy did not have quite as strong an appeal as it did in later years.  
Also, piracy in the 1990s was a clan-based affair, and it would not have been easy 
even for the criminal-minded migrant to find a role in it. Those responsible for most acts 
of piracy back then were from the Majerteen clan in Puntland, from which they derived 
protection and to whose leaders they paid loyalties in cash or kind.291 Outsiders who 
could not get into these closed groups could form a group of their own, but then they 
would not have benefitted from the protection and clan networks that made the ransom 
process possible. They also risked getting into trouble with the dominant clan groups by 
unknowingly attacking a vessel belonging to, or protected by, the Majerteen.292  
The business model that characterizes Somali piracy today is somewhat tied to 
clan affiliations—as are most things in Somalia—but these ties are loose enough for 
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outsiders to find a niche. Recruitment is based more on skill sets than on clan 
affiliations.293 Although there were always a high number of poverty-stricken potential 
recruits, it was the change in the organization of Somali piracy from the 1990s to the 
2000s that better accounts for its rapid growth in the post-tsunami years. 
Piracy had started to take root along the Somali coast long before the tsunami, 
and, with the advent of the business model, it was destined for exponential growth. The 
tsunami simply served as a catalyst, providing an extra motive and skilled labor, to a 
process whose outcome was inevitable. First, the tsunami waves that washed rusted 
containers ashore brought to the fore allegations of toxic waste dumping and increased 
Somalis’ frustration with the international community. Second, by destroying fishing 
equipment and putting many fishermen out of work, the tsunami made available skilled 
labor for pirate gangs. Before the tsunami, however, some fishermen had already turned 
to piracy, full-time or part-time, and after the tsunami there were many more who were 
considering giving up their lifelong trade to embrace it.294 The lure of instant wealth at 
minimal risk was too strong to ignore, and there is little doubt that the leaders of pirate 
groups would have been able to get the fishermen they needed even if fisheries 
production had remained at its pre-tsunami level.295 Pirate groups today are typically 
made up of ex-fishermen, ex-militiamen, and a few technicians, each recruited for the 
specific skills they bring in.296 Most of today’s pirates tend to have a background in 
fisheries297—not surprising since fisheries was the last honest source of livelihood for 
many along the coast—but they nonetheless continue to be employees in a business 
controlled by profit-seeking entrepreneurs.  
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Reflecting on piracy’s economic roots, it is clear that the need to survive pushed 
many out-of-work coastal dwellers in Somalia—such as Ali in Eyl and Hayeysi in 
Harardhere—to become pirates after the tsunami. The fact that the fisheries sector, which 
used to be the basis of the coastal economy, never grew back to its pre-tsunami level 
means that there was little or no incentive for former fishermen to return to their trade. In 
comparison, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 put many coastal inhabitants in Southeast 
Asia out of work, and young men with a background in the maritime trade industry or in 
fisheries soon found piracy to be a rational choice in the absence of alternative sources of 
revenue.298 Piracy in the region skyrocketed, and until 2005 the waters within the Strait of 
Malacca were considered the most dangerous in the world. As Indonesia and other 
Southeast Asian countries recovered from the financial crisis,299 there was a notable 
decrease in piracy in the region. Piracy was reduced by as much as 65 percent between 
2003 and 2008;300 and only two attacks were attempted in the Strait of Malacca in 2008, 
down from 12 in 2005.301 Of course, economic recovery also coincided with a strong 
repressive regional strategy at sea. Even so, the influence of sudden economic hardship 
on the rise in piracy in that part of the world was quite clear. Worth noting is that Asian 
piracy never gained the sophistication and organization found in Somalia’s business 
model. The general trend of pirate acts in Southeast Asia was to board vessels, mostly at 
anchor and at night, to seize or steal cargo, equipment, cash and the personal items of the 
crew.302 In the few cases where crew members were kidnapped for ransom, the amounts 
paid were below $20,000.303 Most attacks were small scale and could be classified as a 
coping mechanism during times of hardship—a temporal situation that was later  
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reversed through a change in economic fortune. Somali pirates today are far richer than 
Somali fishermen ever were, so unlike in Asia, Somali-based piracy will likely continue 
even if the fisheries sector is revitalized.   
The prolonged absence of a state authority in Somalia continues to present 
uniquely favorable conditions for the development of piracy. The tsunami caused more 
devastation to Asian than Somali coastal communities, and though the former received 
more aid than the latter, many Asian fishermen too suffered life-altering losses. One 
might have expected these out-of-work fishermen to resort to piracy, but statistics show 
that piracy in the area has been on the decline since regional countermeasures went into 
effect in July 2004.304 It seems that apart from the socio-cultural differences between the 
two areas, the presence of a law enforcing authority in the Southeast Asian states has 
been a crucial factor. Also, some of the world’s poorest communities can be found near 
oceans with heavy maritime traffic, but that has not pushed them to resort to piracy. The 
case of Yemen is very telling. Just like Somalia, it borders the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, 
and the Indian Ocean. It is by far the poorest country in the Middle East and more than 25 
percent of its population, mostly coastal dwellers, live below the poverty line and have 
done so for generations.305 Yet, Yemenis have been more the victims than the 
perpetrators of piracy in the area.306 Again, the difference could be explained by the 
presence of a law enforcing authority in Yemen, and its absence in Somalia. James 
Tong’s Rational Choice Model applies here. It contends that in times of hardship, men 
consider criminality to be one of many survival strategies, but it is only in the absence of 
certain and severe punishment that the urge for criminal behavior actually translates into 
an increase in criminal activities.307 In Somalia, lawlessness has guaranteed impunity for 
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many years, especially on land, and has allowed piracy to benefit from safe havens and 
the superior organization that accounts for its current success.   
There is today a stronger link between piracy and fisheries in Somalia than there 
was in the pre-tsunami years. Former fishermen constitute an important element of pirate 
gangs, outnumbering militiamen who dominated in previous years. Their boats are used 
more frequently to launch attacks, and it is the presence of fishing gear onboard 
suspected mother ships that provides pirates with an alibi whenever they have the 
misfortune of running into international naval patrols. A decline in fisheries over several 
years and the sudden loss of assets after the tsunami pushed fishermen toward piracy, but 
this still does not account for the latter’s exponential growth. As indicated above, 
fishermen have always been mere employees, playing little more than a secondary role in 
piracy, and could never have pushed piracy to its current levels. Though a rise in piracy 
coincided with a decline in fisheries during this period, no causal relationship could be 
established between the two. Onward from 2005, piracy was driven by profit-minded 
businessmen who could have achieved their objectives irrespective of trends in artisanal 




Trends in fisheries and piracy examined over the past five decades do not suggest 
a direct relationship between the economic status of Somali fishermen and the level of 
piracy off the HOA. There were many periods in Somalia’s history when a drastic decline 
in fisheries did not coincide with a rise in piracy. In fact, piracy off Somalia’s long 
coastline was either nonexistent or stayed insignificantly low until 2005, even though 
fisheries there experienced a decline at several points in the 1970s, early 1980s, and in 
the immediate aftermath of state collapse in 1991. Apart from the year 2005, a rise in 
piracy and a decline in fisheries never happened simultaneously, or close enough in time 
for the latter to influence the former. The singular exception in 2005, which saw piracy 
rising as fisheries declined, was shown in Chapter IV to have resulted more from other 
factors, like the maturing of the business model than from the survival imperative of local 
fishermen.  
The idea of piracy as an organized, profit-seeking enterprise originated from the 
central coast of Somalia, and by 2005 it had developed into a thriving business. Just like 
the militia groups responsible for acts of piracy in the 1990s, this self-sustaining business 
model continued to use grievances from coastal communities—notably toxic waste 
dumping and illegal fishing by foreign vessels—to gain local support, but its underlying 
goal was to maximize profits by attacking vessels at sea that could yield ransom 
payments. This business model is unconcerned with the plight of Somali fishermen, as 
attested to by the fact that the millions of dollars received in ransoms so far have never 
been used to improve the fisheries sector. Fishermen responded to the lure of easy 
money, just as do many other young Somalis, but they were always mere employees in 
this criminal enterprise, driven first by warlords in the 1990s, and then later by 
businessmen. Piracy, especially under the business model, holds the promise of instant 
wealth and the easiest way to break out of Somalia’s misery.  
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The enduring condition of statelessness, frequent and prolonged droughts, as well 
as intermittent fighting have combined in the past twenty years to produce misery in a 
country that was already one of the world’s poorest before 1991. The need to survive 
pushed many Somalis to emigrate and others to turn to crime. Whereas poverty and 
desperation have defined many Somalis’ lives for the past twenty years, even longer for 
some, piracy only became a significant threat five years ago. This huge gap in time 
certainly disqualifies survival as a possible cause of Somali piracy. Furthermore, several 
coastal communities in other parts of the world have lived in extreme poverty for many 
decades without resorting to piracy.  
Somali frustration over IUU fishing could be sufficient motive for aggression at 
sea, but it fails to explain why piracy rose sharply after 2005, and not before then. What 
makes Somalia unique and accounts for the exponential rise in piracy off its shores in 
recent years is instead a combination of misery, absence of law enforcement, and the 
opportunistic nature offered by the business model. Even though misery and lawlessness 
have both characterized Somalia for a couple of decades, it was only in 2003 that the 
profit-maximizing scheme of the business model was put in place to exploit the numerous 
opportunities presented by heavy traffic at sea. The adaptive nature of the business model 
has ensured exponential growth in Somali piracy even in the face of very strong 
international mobilization around counter-piracy efforts. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since 2008, a series of UNSCR permitted the deployment of an impressive 
armada of naval vessels from the U.S., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
the EU, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, and Singapore.308 The maritime 
community takes comfort in the presence of the world’s best naval forces off the HOA, 
and it is quite conceivable that in their absence the piracy problem would be worse. 
Though the number of attacks has continued to rise, the annual percentage of successful 
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hijackings has decreased since naval patrols started in 2008.309 Still, the number of 
hijacked vessels rose from 42 in 2008 to 47 in 2009, and some vessels were even taken 
within the IRTC, where maximum protection from naval forces is promised.310 Also, 
efforts to judge and incarcerate pirates are plagued by many legal loopholes, low funding, 
and absence of political will among regional partners. Those with adequate judicial 
systems have been reluctant to conduct trials on their home soil, preferring to dump 
captured pirates in Kenya, and it was not until June 2010 that the first Somali pirates 
were tried in Europe and in the U.S..311 Thus, despite great efforts by the international 
community, piracy in the HOA continues to rise suggesting that the current counter-
piracy approach is flawed. The findings of this thesis suggest a few alternatives. 
1. Interdict IUU fishing 
There is the perception, at least within Somalia, that the strong naval presence at 
sea protects the many European and Asian vessels involved in IUU fishing and toxic 
waste dumping—both being illegal activities under international law, but overlooked by 
the international community and its law enforcing navies in the area.312 This perception 
is reinforced by reports that Spanish forces have in the past detached themselves from 
counter-piracy duties to protect their flag vessels engaged in illegal fishing close to 
Somali shores.313 When the Spanish flagged fishing vessel Alakrana was hijacked by  
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Somali pirates in 2009, Spanish forces made several unsuccessful attempts to free it, and 
when the vessel was later released after a $4 million ransom no investigations were 
carried out by Spanish authorities.314  
There have been calls by the international community and within the EU itself to 
address IUU fishing, both as a means to preserve the environment and maritime resources 
around Somalia, and as the first step toward a more comprehensive strategy against 
piracy.315 The findings of this thesis support the contention by proponents of this 
comprehensive approach that the continuation of these illegal activities by foreign 
commercial vessels undermines counter-piracy efforts and reinforces the legitimacy 
pirates enjoy at home. In a bid to curtail IUU fishing, UN officials suggested in 2006 that 
an embargo be enforced on fish coming out of Somali waters, but the proposal was 
rejected by the UN Security Council.316 Like Spain, many of the countries participating 
in counter-piracy efforts are also those who benefit the most from illegal fishing in 
Somali waters. The EU for its part asserts that its forces protect and reassure only those 
legitimate fishermen operating on the high seas outside Somalia’s EEZ.317 Based on 
piracy’s growing profitability, preventing IUU fishing is unlikely to stop it, but 
prevention would help, both by reducing the number of potential targets and removing 
the legitimizing myth on which the business model thrives. 
2. Revive Artisanal Fisheries 
Though it was found in this study that trends in fisheries did not influence the 
level of maritime piracy in Somalia, no counter-piracy measure there can have success 
unless the perpetrators of piracy are offered genuine alternatives. The fisheries sector 
presents the best option for many reasons. First, it would impact the same communities 
that currently depend on piracy. Second, the fisheries sector has been shown to have 
ample potential for growth, and was suffers mostly from poor management—a situation 
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that could be corrected through training and direct material assistance from the 
international community to local groups. By developing markets for the different species 
and building cold rooms to overcome the conservation problem, the international 
community could turn Somali fisheries into a self-sustaining business sector. Third, 
though piracy attracts recruits from far and wide, former fishermen, with their deep 
knowledge of the sea, are an important component of pirate groups.318 Taking them out 
of the fight would greatly assist counter-piracy efforts. Most pirates are in it for the 
money and would like to retire to a more legitimate business after a good catch319—
fisheries would grant them this option.  
It should be remembered that the fisheries sector thrived in Somalia long after the 
state collapsed in 1991.320 The great challenge here lies in how to engage the coastal 
communities so that they come to believe in the fisheries industry again. As pointed out 
by Murphy,321 Somalia is a failed country, but many of its communities are very 
functional. There is room for sub-state engagement, either through specialized 
international organizations, such as the FAO, or through friendly Muslim nations, such as 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who have already demonstrated such 
capacity especially, after the tsunami.322 
3. Make Piracy More Risky  
The biggest risk to pirates right now is to get caught and possibly be thrown in jail 
for a while. Pirates generally operate away from warships patrolling the area so they do 
not get caught, and are very aware of the legal loopholes that facilitate their release even 
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on those rare occasions when they do get caught.323 Individual nations with greater stakes 
in maritime trade than Kenya should develop the necessary legal framework for trying 
and sentencing pirates. Signatories of UNCLOS are aware of their rights and obligations 
in prosecuting captured pirates,324 but few have actually developed national legislation to 
tackle the issue; now is the time to do so. The certainty and severity of punishment would 
make the risk of becoming a pirate significantly higher than the risk of not becoming 
one.325 The rational thinkers among the pirates will eventually opt out, and there would 
be fewer recruits.  
4. Make Piracy Less Profitable 
Piracy is the best business in Somalia, attracting recruits with the promise of a 
better life that would otherwise be impossible to attain.326 It becomes too difficult to not 
pay ransom after sailors are kidnapped, so the focus should be on prevention. If pirates go 
for many months without any successful attacks, they would have to seek other business 
opportunities such as revitalizing Somalia’s fisheries. The challenge is to harden targets 
so that the pirates’ every attempt is foiled. Since warships are not able to protect every 
single vessel within the very large area of concern, 2.5 million square miles, individual 
vessels should invest in training and equipment to reduce their vulnerabilities. For 
example, the construction and use of safe rooms where crews under attack can seek 
refuge have been successful in delaying hijackings long enough for assistance from 
warships to arrive. Also, it is abnormal that ships are attacked within the IRTC. As much 
as possible, transit within the recommended corridor and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean 
should be in groups and under escort from warships in the area. This will cause some 
delays for the commercial vessels, but the achievement of safe passage for all will 
hopefully have the long-term effect of putting pirates out of business.  
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It is clear that repression at sea alone does not work, and will not work until steps 
are taken to engage coastal communities on land. The above recommendations are all 
applicable within the current context of statelessness in Somalia—a situation that has 
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